Revisiting South Eastern Europe:
Comparative Social History of the 19th and 20th Centuries

Introduction

“[…] the non-westerner is always living in another time, even when he is our contemporary”.

A central concern of the conference is to discuss space, time, and comparison as analytical categories for European social history of the 19th and 20th centuries, and to concentrate on the enlargement and enforcement of these categories from a South Eastern European perspective. When Maria Todorova’s study „The Trap of Backwardness: Modernity, Temporality, and the Study of Eastern European Nationalism” was published in Slavic Review in spring 2005, it provided the first methodological confirmation for the observation which preceded the conception of the conference, that the quite distinct and, at least on the part of the Western side, rarely reflected ‘Mental Mapping’ with regard to the Balkans is faced with a near to complete gap within empirical comparative modern (social) history. The conference is intended to provide momentum for opening up a discursive platform that “enforces the historian’s consciousness of potentials and, at the same time, invites him or her to reflect on his or her own cultural location”.

In other words, modifying one of Jürgen Kocka’s titles, the conference invites to discuss South Eastern Europe as a challenge for a comparative history of Europe.

In the following research overview I shall first discuss the mentioned analytical categories (comparison, space, time) and then contextualize the aim and object of the single conference panels.

The volume „Nationalismen in Europa. West- und Osteuropa im Vergleich“, edited by Ulrike von Hirschhausen and Jörn Leonhard shows in what ways a collection of comparative and single case studies can be inspiring and profitable for European perspectives as a whole. Moreover, the volume offers a rare example of a balanced interpretative approach to Western and Eastern European nationalisms, once more excluding, however, the European Southeast. In the same volume, Dieter Langewiesche rightly criticizes the fact that comparative studies on Eastern European nationalisms are often written without an adequate historical background.

1 Maria Todorova, The Trap of Backwardness: Modernity, Temporality, and the Study of Eastern European Nationalism, in: Slavic Review 64/1, 2005, p. 140-164, p. 155. In the following, works by conference participants are emphasized in bold printing, in order to illustrate the research cross-section and perspectives they represent.


4 See note 2. Jolanta Sujecka (ed.), The National Idea as a Research Problem, Warsaw, 2002, represents a rare example that includes Southeastern Europe into an inner-Eastern Europe comparison without so much as drawing the mental border between East Central Europe and the Balkans, with contributions concerning Poles, Lithuanians, Bulgarians, Macedonians, Ukrainians, Hungarians, Czechs, Kashubes and Buriats. All European regions are also represented from an equal and integrative perspective in Iván Zoltán Dénes (ed.), Liberty and the Search for Identity. Liberal Nationalisms and the Legacy of Empires, Budapest 2006 (containing: Diana Mishkova, The Interesting Anomaly of Balkan Liberalism); as well as Tony Judt, Postwar. A His-
tive research tends to either typologize matters in a manner too abstract to “acknowledge in detail the specificities of the single nations and nation states”, or to analyse single cases separately and without connecting them to each other. A comparison of only single aspects of a phenomenon, on the other hand, precludes the possibility to gain an overall picture. In the conference, the depth of such methodological traps and potentials of comparative research shall be plumbed by assigning an extraordinarily significant space to the chair persons, commentators, and the discussion. The results of such an organisational approach shall then also be present in the planned publication of the proceedings: The case studies shall be complemented and put into context with each other by systematizing contributions.

Much has been said over the last years on historical comparison, its potentials and pitfalls, as well as the necessity to alter and innovate it. However, this criticism of more classical comparative approaches that were conducted from the 1970s onwards was hardly accompanied by accordingly renewed comparative empirical works. As a result, several concepts with sometimes separate, sometimes overlapping meaning emerged, as yet lacking conceptual clarity (transfer, relational, transnational, entangled history, ‘histoire croisée’, and others). At the same time, a vivid discussion on a renewed or enlarged European history in the context of transnational and global historical analytical categories is underway, which is much concerned with Eastern European concepts of space; however, this discussion also largely disregards the East European South. For Southeastern Europe as a spatial category therefore results particularly valid what Carsten Goehrke and Heiko Haumann have pointed out with regard to Eastern European History as a discipline: It will, they write, “only become superfluous [...] when historians will regard it as natural, both in terms of linguistic qualifications and of cultural dispositions, to research the history of Russia, Hungary or Serbia in the same way as the history of England, France or Switzerland.”


Carsten Goehrke, Heiko Haumann, Osteuropa und Osteuropäische Geschichte. Konstruktionen – Geschichtsbilder – Aufgaben. Ein Beitrag aus Schweizer Sicht, in: Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 52/4,
The differing forms of the interpretative pattern nation in Western and Eastern Europe indeed incite scholars to use the potentials of systematic comparison. What is more, the conference will go beyond and contextualize other crucial phenomena of modern history, like religion, confession, fascism, communism, and their saturation with nation. In short: It will add Southeastern European perspectives to several central research tropes of social history.

Finally, the significance of regional and local identity affiliations shall be taken into account, especially in the “European in-between-spaces” (“europäische Zwischenräume”), which are particularly apt for a geographically focussed comparison of various national groups, as well as of the fields of tension between national, regional, and local articulations of identity.

The concept of identity – the understanding of one’s self, and the orientation given to one’s life – on the one hand is connected to a sense of certainty and inner stability. On the other hand it contains aspects of flowing and multiple categories of belonging. Moreover, personal identity, which generally refers to the image that a person possesses of him- or herself, is to be differentiated from the rootedness of such individual identities in collective contexts. In order to create such collective contexts, reference systems derived from his-
tory and conveying meaning, like signs, symbols, rituals, and myths, are employed and serve to reduce complexity. The invented and constructed parts – Hobsbawm’s “invention of tradition”\(^\text{14}\) are not to be over-estimated or even considered in the absolute, since traditions are constructed from “historical settings”, from a “peculiar mixture of remembrance and oblivion”, and are by no means arbitrary, as they, if they want to be successful, have to “take into account the social framework as well as cultural values and needs.”\(^\text{15}\) A plausible explanation for the specific effectiveness of national identity seems to be that it is compatible with other loyalties and dispositions, working in them and through them. This thesis that national affiliation is particularly capable of connecting to central socioeconomic processes and of gaining momentum in them and through them, however, disregards the fact that events, characters, and symbols that carry national value in a given milieu might not pertain this value when transferred to a different social milieu. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Charlotte Tacke consider the question of “how the offers of national identification were understood and adapted by various social groups [as] yet largely unanswered”.\(^\text{16}\)

With reference to Stefan Troebst, concepts of historical space are defined as „a historiographic transnational-comparative method”, as “a heuristic trick apt to provide meso-regions that are non-territorialized and limited in time, yet comprehensive in terms of states, societies, nations, or even civilizations, and can serve as working hypotheses of comparative research, in order to establish and delimit specific spatial clusters with structural long-durée characteristics from each other. It is not the single characteristics that are unique and therefore specific for a certain cluster, but their combination.”\(^\text{17}\) The conference will make use of the potentials of comparative research: 1) To formulate questions that possibly would have never occurred without comparison; 2) to possibly correct wrong assumptions; 3) to define possible research topics; 4) to widen the general perspective, yet without losing sight of empirical detail.\(^\text{18}\)

In the face of the mentioned “mental mapping” with regard to the Balkans it seems indispensable to problematize the categories of space and time that shape – or could shape - historiographic thinking. Hitherto the West mostly has been seen as the model or forerunner of plurifold historical developments, while the East copied and adapted these develop-

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ments. It suffices to name the example of the spatial category *nation state*. While Great Britain and France indeed possess a statehood that much earlier could be defined as national than that of their Southeastern pendants, Germany and Italy in many respects are “more Eastern European” than several Southeastern European states. At least two of them, Greece and Serbia, obtained statehood one or two generations earlier, and Romania’s unity and Bulgaria’s sovereignty were achieved practically contemporaneously. What is more, the premise of an original matrix, against which anything that follows is to be matched, and the consequential feeling of backwardness are not characteristics that pertain exclusively to Southeastern European historiography. For decades it shaped German self-definitions. The mental matrix that was an effect of the Cold War “forced” Germany, as it were, to always compare to the rest of the “West” and consequently perceive itself as “belated”. Omitted was the fact that the German founding of a nation state typologically is to be connected to the Italian variant, but also to the successor states of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires.

Frequently, explanatory approaches and typologies of nationalisms reach their limits when it comes to applying the theory to Eastern and especially Southeastern Europe. Sometimes, such typologies outrightly exclude Eastern Europe from European history with the cliché of two millennia of separate civic development after the division of the Roman Empire. Instead of a qualitative difference defined by temporal precedence in approaching Western and Eastern Europeans, which a priori turns the first into progressive inventors of ideas and the latter into derivatives and exporters, Todorova pleads for discarding calendrical hierarchies and the underlying matrix of primacy and derivate, and instead point out the basic similarity of all human societies. Nationalism can then be understood as an “almost synchronous rearrangement of group solidarities in human society”: “As a global social process that is itself a by-product of urbanization, bureaucratization, the revolution in communications, and so on, it is intimately linked to modernity.” Synchronous here does not mean *contemporary* in a mechanical sense, but rather *relative* within a long durée frame-

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20 For example Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford 2006/1983. Gellner sees nationalism as a product of modernity, and as such inextricably linked to industrialization. This approach disregards both the national movements in the primarily agrarian societies of Eastern Europe and the fact that nationally motivated unrest was in fact present in the non-industrialized areas of, for example, Spain and Italy. Cf. John Breuilly, Introduction, in: ibid., p. XIII-LIII. An analogous criticism is to be found in Hirschhausen, Leonhard, Europäische Nationalismen im West-Ost-Vergleich, p. 22, who add that „the relatively long lack of a mass nationalism in highly industrialized England“ does not fit into Gellner’s pattern, either.

21 Cf. for example Hagen Schulze, Staat und Nation in der europäischen Geschichte, München, 1994, p. 17: „I consider it plausible that, since the division of the continent into a Western and an Eastern Roman Empire around 330 a. d., two European civilizational spheres have developed, which, for about two millennia and up to our present, have developed next to each other, not without interaction, yet without any real merging.

22 Todorova, The Trap of Backwardness, p. 149f.
work inspired by Braudel, i.e. a historical period – the age of nationalism, lasting until today – in which differing paths of development can be treated as relatively synchronous.

The plea to no longer describe a period of time or a long durée phenomenon simply as a linear and consecutive process, but rather as an interconnected one, corresponds to Koselleck’s concept of the non-contemporaneous of the contemporaneous (die Ungleichzeitigkeit des Gleichzeitigen), i.e. the postulated existence of several “layers of time of differing duration and varying origins, which however are contemporaneously present and effective” and should be applied impartially from a more complex perspective rather than on the basis of hierarchically arranged West-East-patterns. Referring to the example of Riga, Hirschhausen/Leonhard also ascertain that in the city existed “a pronounced contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous with regard to the interrelation of industrial modernization and nation-building [...]. when in the industrialized space that Riga was a nationalized concept of class of the Latvians clashed with the traditional concept of estates of the Germans”, and conclude: “Consequently the investigation of single cases does not deliver any argument for a specific West-East-slope, according to which industrial “backwardness” without further ado can be applied as an explanation for “belated” nationalism, for example in Russia. Backwardness as an isolated socioeconomic criterion thus cannot convincingly be applied as a comparative tool within the history of European nationalisms.”

„Even today, when a Frenchman is socialized to Voltaire, he has to learn him anew; Voltaire is not in his blood. What makes this socialization process different for a Pole or a Hungarian today?“ Todorova asks, and pleads for rendering the categories West and East more dynamic and for regarding them as spaces and times with equal rights and with huge unexploited potential for comparison: „After all [...] peasants were turned not only into Greeks, Serbs, or Bulgarians, but also into Frenchmen.“ This would then also permit to change direction: Byron and Pushkin can hardly be understood without considering Greek nationalism; the Polish divisions and the nationalism that resulted from them influenced Rousseau and many others; German folklore is incomprehensible without its connections to Serbia. Not lastly, it is a goal of the conference to locate and explore the potentials of such changes of direction.

Having put these basic thoughts first, I will now summarize the reflections that preceded the organisation of the panels, in order to elucidate the thematic range with regard to central tropes of European history, as well as their clustering into sections. Thereby I contem-

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23 Todorova, ibid., p. 150, mentions the example of the Hilandar-priest Paisii who wrote a Slavo-Bulgarian history in 1762, which later was to be of eminent influence. Evidently, he had had no access to nationally inspired texts in French, English, German, or Russian language. This early evidence of Bulgarian nationalism cannot be understood on the matrix of original and copy. Instead, a mental pattern of unifying modern structural characteristics in relative synchronicity with each other easily comes to terms with the Bulgarian monch.


27 Ibid., p. 154, with reference to Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870—1914, Stanford 1976. Very graphic results Todorova’s example of the historical development of agriculture from Southwestern Asia to the Balkans and from there to the European Northwest in the course of 4000 years. [...]. once the process is completed”, she asks, „does it matter where it originated and by whom? Just imagine Saddam Hussein commenting on the derivative character of agriculture on the British isles...“ (p. 156).

28 Ibid., p. 158.
poraneously display the state of the art of (comparative) social history of the 19th and 20th centuries, from an interdisciplinary and Southeastern European perspective.

### Mental Maps of the Self and the Other

We will start with a discussion of cognitive maps: those the West fosters about the Balkans, those the Balkans foster about the West. Maria Todorova’s ‘Imagining the Balkans’ and the subsequent debate with Holm Sundhaussen ignited a small boom of the topic of mental maps about and within Southeastern Europe, 29 which however, and understandably so, was only marginally received by scholars working on Western European topics. 30 From the claim to dispose of the subject “Eastern European History” as a separate discipline 31 to the so called spatial turn, i. e. rather the innovated structuring of historical spaces 32, the debate rather concentrates on Eastern Europe beyond its Southeastern part.

The mentioned consciousness of a “temporal lag” and “lack”, inherent both in Western accounts of non-Western nationalisms and in the self-portrayals of the non-Western world, almost inevitably depicts these nationalisms as immature, young, out of control, or, since they are transplanted from their original setting, as inapt for the new context and therefore degenerated: The non-Western world lives in a time that lies always and by definition “behind” the West. 33 In a synthesis of the previous debate, Holm Sundhaussen recently has pointed out the “intertwining of mental map and historical region”. 34 It is just that which we shall problematize. On the whole, it seems that, indeed, the field of tension between processes of perception and construction with regard to Southeastern Europe and its definition as a spatial category, i. e. the search for structural anchor points and commonalities, could be conducive for future comparative research.

Those responsible for the postulated backwardness are to be found in the region itself: the Habsburgs, the Ottomans, the Romanovs, the Soviets. An exception is to be found in the case of Turkey, where the last century of Ottoman history rather is seen as a quasi-colony of the West. In the rest of Eastern Europe, imperial power and Soviet communism are seen as having inhibited the region to undergo its own evolution within its own organic space –

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33 Todorova, The Trap of Backwardness, p. 145.

Europe. The backwardness hence is artificial, and the future foresees an acceleration of
time, a catching-up with what could have long since been. Europe’s past in this way be-
comes Eastern Europe’s future. In fact, the postulate of original and copy only makes sense
when empirical research manages to show direct influence and patterns of communication
and transfer, like for example the influence of Czech education and schooling on the Slo-
vak society, or the Greek on the Bulgarian. Beyond this any postulated primacy has to re-
main immaterial: a mental map.\footnote{Todorova, The Trap of Backwardness, p. 160.}

A discussion of mental dispositions in the framework of present transformational processes
and the project of vaulting, normative European union will constitute the entry into prob-
lematizing methodological potentials, pitfalls and research desiderata when it comes to
c omparative history with a Southeastern European focus. Even after the end of the Cold
War a tendency has remained valid to take Western European civil society as a yardstick
for a higher European integrative model, which, once again, does not do justice to the
multi-layered and controversial nature of European comparative aspects. Moreover, the
teleological tendency to stylize the post-1945 process of European unification as a peek of a
century-old development, instead of emphasizing its constructed nature, also operates with
rative potentials between the West and the Southeast.

\textit{Almost all of the presently existing Central European and Southeast European states can refer to an existence prior to 1918. Cf. \textit{Guido Franzinetti}, The Austrian Littoral in a Cisleithanian Perspective, in: Actae Histriae 14/1, 2006 (forthcoming).}\footnote{Kocka, Das östliche Mitteleuropa als Herausforderung, p. 172; similar Langewiesche, Staatsbildung und Natio-
tsbildung in Deutschland, p. 66f.}

\textit{Guido Franzinetti, I conflitti balcanici e le „nuove guerre” [The Balkan conflicts and the „new wars"], in: William Bonapace, Maria Perino (eds.), Srebrenica, fine secolo – Nazionalismi, intervento internazionale, società civile [Srebrenica, turn of the century – nationalisms, international intervention, civic society], Novi Ligure, 2005, p. 63-74; \textit{Holm Sundhaussen}, Der „wilde“ Balkan: Imagination und Realität einer europäischen
Fascism, War, and Society: Yugoslavia, Romania, France, Italy

The more recent debate on the characteristics of totalitarian or authoritarian societies\textsuperscript{43} and the gains and risks of comparing them concentrates on several topical tropes: the comparison of fascisms, mostly its Italian and German variants, the systemic comparison of national socialism and communism, the latter mostly in its stalinist variant, as well as the specific case of comparing the national socialist and the communist German states.\textsuperscript{44} Here


Cf. the overview in Detlef Schmiedeen-Ackermann, Diktaturen im Vergleich, Darmstadt 2006; as well as Juan J. Linz, Totalitäre und autoritäre Regime, Berlin 2000, who divides non-democratic systems into „totalitarian“ and „authoritarian“ regimes. The latter group is constituted by variations of military dictatorships, developing dictatorships and post-totalitarian regimes.

\textsuperscript{44} Cf. Schmiedeen-Ackermann, Diktaturen im Vergleich, p. 68-142; furthermore the plea for comparison in Imanuel Geiss, Die Totalitarismen unseres Jahrhunderts. Kommunismus und Nationalsozialismus im historisch-politischen Vergleich, in: Ekkehard Jesse (ed.), Totalitarismus im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Bilanz der internationalen Forschung, Baden-Baden 1999, p. 160-175, as well as the general critical overview given by the quite diverging contributions in the same volume. More rarely have been conducted empirical social history analyses of societies which have lived through both national socialism and communism. Cf. for example Eric
also, the inclusion of Southeastern Europe represents a desideratum, and accordingly most of the research presented in this panel is work in progress within a field that is just opening up.45

During the Cold War, the so-called „debate on totalitarianism“ was characterized by a mixture of empirical-analytical thought and moralizing-normative value-giving. After 1989, efforts to compare national socialism and communism increased. On the one hand, attempts were fuelled to present Hitlerism and Stalinism as equals and turn hierarchies upside down, dispute the uniqueness of the national socialist crimes and centrally put the case for a reckoning of the crimes of communism.46 On the other hand the new systemic and mental dispositions as well as newly open archives were taken as an occasion for more pragmatic historiographic inquiries and historicizing the political instrumentalisation of earlier times.47 A consequence of the communist imposing of mental parameters is the difficulty of the post-communist societies – and especially those which, today again, are post-war societies, like the Yugoslav successor states – to establish a differentiated and objectified platform for discussion. Instead, here also “good” is turned into “evil” and vice versa.48

Comparative history of fascism and national socialism has pointed out typological differences when it comes, for example, to comparing the mechanisms of radicalization in the German occupation policies in Western and Eastern countries. Not least, racial ideologies – mental mapping, if you will – were responsible for this. Yugoslavia’s quick change from friend to foe, for example, can be referred to a Weltanschauung in which the Balkans a priori were excluded from European civilization and which was taken over and intensified by national socialism. In Serbia, for instance, several layers of resentment existed: Old conceptions of enmity from Habsburg times and the First World War mixed with the new classification which saw Yugoslavia as belonging to the East. There ensued a brutal policy which did not count - as in France or Italy - on a minimum consensus within the population, but rather on the radicalization of the battle of all against all.49

D. Weitz, Creating German Communism 1890-1990, Princeton 1997, who investigates into the history of communism in Germany within the varying political systems between 1890 and 1990.


47 Cf. for example Abbott Gleason, Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War, New York, Oxford 1995; as further as the contributions in Jesse, Totalitarismus, with further bibliographical references.


49 Lutz Klinkhammer, Grundlinien nationalsozialistischer Besatzungspolitik in Frankreich, Jugoslawien und Italien, in: Christof Dipper et al. (eds.), Faschismus und Faschismen im Vergleich. Wolfgang Schieder zum 60.
Pierre Bourdieu’s reflections result methodologically inspiring. He points out that any communication and any interaction is dependent of its social setting; the same words can obtain different meanings, in accordance with the context in which they are uttered. Moreover, words and concepts can adapt their meaning when transported from one social or ideological setting to another.\textsuperscript{50} Which, then, are the dominant discourses of a given space and time, and which changes do these discourses undergo when breaks in the social contexts occur? How can adequate interpretative categories be found to describe continuities and discontinuities in discourses and actions as part of radicalized and atomized, if not war-torn, societies, characterized both by a polarization of ideologies and by a lowered barrier towards violence?

In accordance with this, the potentials of a life-world centered approach to social settings within totalitarian states move to the center of attention. The biggest advantage of such an approach, so it seems, lies in the fact that it doubts any categorical order or hierarchy of things and events, and with Hannah Arendt emphasizes that the \textit{pretension} for total power represents an ideal type and a potentially omnipresent menace to modernity, rather than an empirically experienced type, which, in fact, has never yet been put into practice.\textsuperscript{51} Consequently, individual experiences are to be taken seriously and analysed in interaction with structural and systemic contextualisations.\textsuperscript{52}

The contributions to this panel range from the interwar period to the post-war years and compare the Romanian, Croatian, Serbian, and Italian fascist movements,\textsuperscript{53} the resettlement policies, resistance and collaboration in Yugoslavia and France,\textsuperscript{54} as well as the end of fascism and the establishment of communism in the Italian-Yugoslav border region.\textsuperscript{55}

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\textsuperscript{51} Hannah Arendt, \textit{Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft}, München 1986/1951, p. 959.


Ethnic and Social Affiliations in the „Long“ 19th Century

Dieter Langewiesche’s definition of *nation* seems concise and conclusive for all variants of constructing and articulating the nation: He sees it as a system of collectively transferred value and structure parameters that encompass both inclusive and exclusive aspects and hereby constitutively contain offers and claims for participation as well as aggressive potentials.\(^{56}\) In varying shades, historiography on the Eastern European nationalisms nearly always refers to the same mental matrix. The actors and promoters of national movements in the best case are interpreted as exporters of a Western ideology, and in the worst as products of big power manipulations. The “belated” carry out mimicry without authentic roots. A further characteristic of this historiography is the dichotomy between a “typically” Western nationalism that strives for a pluralistic society, and a “typically” Eastern nationalism, which is of a cultural nature and consequently rather tends to promote a closed society. In other words: Western nationalism bears a higher potential of participation, while the Eastern variant is prone to a higher potential of aggression.\(^{57}\)

Eastern European historians regard nationalism as the key topos of modernity and almost exclusively concentrate on the birth, maturation, and victory of national liberation wars, a master narrative which rather leaves other processes and events to oblivion. While these historians reject to interpret the nationalism of “their” countries purely as an export product of a contagious disease, they explicitly or implicitly share the notion that the most important ideological currents of the 18\(^{\text{th}}\) and 19\(^{\text{th}}\) centuries – Enlightenment, Romanticism, nationalism, republicanism, socialism etc. – are “Western” ideas transplanted onto Eastern European soil, even if they do not go as far as to regard the outcome of these transplantations as degenerated. This goes hand in hand with the treatment of the organic nation as a

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phenomenon existing from times immemorial, for which Western nationalism simply functioned as the reveille.\textsuperscript{58}

Social history research analyzing reactions as well as processes of adaptation and change within various social groups (professional groups, religious groups, generations, gendered groups etc.) is in upturn, as far as Southeastern European societies and their relationships and handling of the nation are concerned; yet it is far from having reached blanket coverage.\textsuperscript{59} Only rarely the fundamental similarity of the phases that nationalizing processes underwent in all European societies have been pointed out, even though both Western and Eastern literature has been providing for this potentiality for a long time.\textsuperscript{60} Equally, the social history writing of the Habsburg Monarchy after 1867 is incomplete, especially when it comes to a systematically comparative approach, be it within the Habsburg lands, be it with other European localities.\textsuperscript{61} The comparison of Western and Eastern European na-

\textsuperscript{58} Augusta Dimou, "... And Then the Prince Kissed Sleeping Beauty." Some Thoughts on Popular Narratives of the Wars of Liberation in the Balkans - A Metaphoric Reading of a Metaphor, in: Jahrbücher für Geschichte und Kultur Südosteuropas 6, 2004, p. 187-196; Guido Franzinetti, Il problema del nazionalismo nella storiografia dell’Europa centro-orientale [The problem of nationalism in East Central European historiography], in: Rivista storica italiana 53/3, 1991, p. 812-846. It should be pointed out that nationalism in Western Europe has been treated as a construction and modern phenomenon for no longer than a generation or two of scholarly writing.


\textsuperscript{60} To mention only the "classics" who identified an essentially similar phenomenon – the development from the initial promoters of national thought to the effects the latter had on the so called „masses” – within different European contexts: Miroslav Hroch, Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas. Eine vergleichende Analyse zur gesellschaftlichen Schichtung der patriotischen Gruppen, Prag 1968; Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen; George L. Mosse, The Nationalisation of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars Through the Third Reich, New York 1977.

\textsuperscript{61} Guido Franzinetti, The Austrian Littoral; Id., Sicurezza e diritti sociali in Polonia, Ungheria e Cecoslovacchia, 1918-1939 [Security and social rights in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia], research pro-
tionalisms hence is “a path that scholars until now rarely have pursued”. What is more, such a comparison must remain shaky without sound knowledge of both objects in question, and in fact comparative research has mostly concentrated on inner-regional comparisons of Southeastern Europe.

Social mobilisation on the one hand and the role of political and intellectual elites on the other, as well as the significance of crises and radical changes as catalysts or focal points for the construction and articulation of the nation are common constitutive aspects of nation-building within all European national movements. In the panel on the “long” 19th century these aspects stand at the center of attention. The three case studies from the Ottoman Empire are sided by an example located at the intersection between Southeastern, East Central, and Western Europe (Trieste) as well as the Irish nation-building, providing for


Hirschhausen, Leonhard, Europäische Nationalismen im West-Ost-Vergleich, p. 12. The volume contains a comprehensive overview of East-West-comparisons, however illustrating once more that Southeastern Europe is almost completely lacking, p. 16-21. But even for their field of investigation the authors point out (p. 10): „Considering the wide range and complexity of research on nationalism, the East-West-comparison undertaken here has to be understood as a symptomatic attempt rather than as a systematic compendium."

Cf. Guido Franzinetti (ed.), Nazionalismo e mutamento sociale in Europa centro-orientale [Nationalism and social change in East Central Europe]. Quaderni storici 28/84, 1993, with contributions on Galicia, the Balkans, and Finnland.


Borut Klabjan, “Češ koslovaško-italijanska mala vojna”: Mednarodne razsežnosti prvega tržaškega proce-
a set of multi-layered questions: Which are the structural preconditions for the construction and articulation of national ideas up to the point of their politicization? Where can those structural and chronological non-contemporaneities as well as fractions and threshold eras be located, which provide for re-aligning the relationship between integrative and aggressive elements? Who were the carriers – initiators, activists, multipliers – of nation-building? What differences result from the social profiles of nationalisms? How was the nation articulated and constructed within a given society and its specific ideological lines of conflict? Which was the role of the state as initiator, motor, or catalyst of nation-building? Which interrelations exist between state-intended, official, and non-statal popular nationalism? How about the repression, saturation, overlapping of national and other loyalties, be they of regional, local, social, political or still another nature? Which was the significance of images of the self, the other, the enemy in the varying contexts, and which mechanisms lay at the base of the constructions, perception and the change of such images? What was the role of the connection between war and nation for the nation-building process? How did the non-contemporaneity of the contemporaneous show in border areas and multinational spaces, as well as in center-periphery relationships?

Religion and Nationality as Cross-Identity Categories

With only slight modifications and supplements, the set of questions sketched above for the context of social and national identities is valid for the construction and articulation of the religious and confessional. While religion for a long time had been regarded rather as a quantité négligeable of modern social history, this has changed over the last years, not least in the light of the so called cultural turn: „Religion has moved on the agenda of social history and is increasingly perceived as a basic dimension of life in industrial societies, offering a source of inspiration and identification.“ Assumptions of a symbiosis between secularization and modernization now are mostly regarded as a mirror of the hopes of secular intellectuals. The hypothesis of secularization – stating that religion on the whole has lost sig-
nificance in modern societies – was counteracted by the thesis of the 19th century as “second confessional age”.\textsuperscript{70} Not least it was the end of communism that brought the interconnections between religion and nation as well as their role within European modernity back into a brighter light. In the face of the manifest effectiveness of religion and nation in the 1990s the concept of “political religion” obtained momentum. Its usefulness is controversial, however.\textsuperscript{71} While the rhetoric of the „holy nation“ constituted a substantial part of nationalist propaganda, up to its most extreme, national socialist variant, this cannot put aside the fact that in European societies “religion” did not dissolve into or was substituted by “nation” – both remained separate concepts, inspite of plurifold, and sometimes intensive intercorrelations.\textsuperscript{72}

That the cross-identity aspects between the religious and/or confessional on the one hand and the national on the other are not to be underestimated, up to phenomena of longer duration, is evidenced by the variability of examples. An inherited burden of the Italian nation state was the antagonism between the liberal and the catholic Italy, which played a significant role also during the fascist years.\textsuperscript{73} Both Czechs and Slovenes picked in Jan Hus and Primož Trubar religious reformers as national founding figures.\textsuperscript{74} At the same time, a connection between catholicism and Slovene nationality is constructed that is nothing short of symbiotic.\textsuperscript{75} The same is valid for the strong Polish minority in Prussia,\textsuperscript{76} and after


\textsuperscript{71} Cf. for example Philippe Burrin, Political Religion. The Relevance of a Concept, in: History and Memory 9, 1997, p. 321-352.


\textsuperscript{75} Egon Pelikan, Pravi Slovenec je katoličan [A real Slovene is catholic], in: Jelka Razpotnik, Helena Pačnik (eds.), Vloga mitov pri poučevanju slovenske zgodovine: zbornik referatov [The role of myths in the teaching of Slovene history: Proceedings], Ljubljana 2003, p. 25-42; cf. also Id., Slovenski politični katolicizem v tridesetih letih v luči evropskih izkušenj [Slovene political catholicism in the 1930s in the light of European experiences], in: Peter Vodopivec (ed.), Slavenci v Evropi [The Slovenes in Europe], Ljubljana 2002, p. 105-144; Id., Akomodacija ideologije političnega katolicizma na Slovenskem [The adaptation of the ideology of political catholicism in Slovenia], Maribor 1997.

\textsuperscript{76} Albert Kotowski, Polen in Deutschland: Religiöse Symbolik als Mittel der nationalen Selbstbehauptung (1870-1918), in: Haupt, Langewiesche, Nation und Religion in Europa, p. 253-279.
1989 catholicism still remained an integral part of Polish identity.\textsuperscript{77} In Romania, the constructors of the nation inseparably connected being Romanian to orthodoxy, which was the basis for the religious messianic message of the legion of the Archangel Michael and its particularly extreme propensity to violence.\textsuperscript{79} In Hungary, a cult of the protestant transylvanian tradition was created in rejection of Austria and the Habsburgs,\textsuperscript{79} and the aspect of protestant-Hungarian resistance against the catholic monarchy resulted handy to the Hungarian stalinists of the 1950s.\textsuperscript{80} Lenin’s mausoleum and the Parisian Pantheon directly borrowed from orthodoxy and catholicism. On the other hand, Turkey was defined along secular lines and searched for its roots in pagan Central Asia rather than in Islam.\textsuperscript{81} It was no coincidence that in Germany the \textit{Kulturkampf} after 1870 aimed at the catholics.\textsuperscript{82} The GDR instrumentalized Martin Luther and Thomas Müntzer and remembered Ernst Thälmann as immortal and “holy”.\textsuperscript{83} But in Western Germany also, the statal reconstruction after the war led to a renewed discussion about the religious identity of the nation. The dissolution of Prussia in 1947 and the creation of the Federal Republic two years later put an end to Germany as a predominantly protestant nation. The catholic Adenauer stood at the top of a country in which protestant and catholic lands made up almost equal parts. The long durée effectiveness of earlier national-religious antagonisms can be seen, for example, in the fact that protestant representatives suspected that Adenauer’s catholicism was a reason for his lack of interest in a reunification with protestant Eastern Germany.\textsuperscript{84} During the 1980s, a debate flared up in Yugoslavia about whether the country’s multi-religiousness constituted an unacceptable danger to the nation.\textsuperscript{85} In any case, it seems necessary to over-


\textsuperscript{80} Eric Roman, \textit{The Stalin Years in Hungary}, Lewiston 1999.


come the customary identification of religion and nation in the Balkans as an explanatory pattern for all possible historical phenomena and renew reflections on their significance and historical coming about.86

Here also, comparative endeavors would gain from a more complex approach and the concept of relative synchronicity: The relationship between nation and religion often was the motive for deep conflicts within nations, and both between confessions (and secular ideologies) as well as within confessional groups.87 The secularly oriented agitators of national movements in many a place by no means gave up their ties to the church and, within the private realm, approved of religious-national (read: religious-secular) compromises. The nation as a supraconfessional construct made it possible for religious minorities like the Jews to also participate in the national master narrative and the national institutions.88 In addition to the sacralization of the nation, the nationalization of the church has to be taken into account. Religious entities as well as religious life itself changed through their identification with the nation. Which role, then, did religion play in legitimizing – up to sacraliz-
ing – nations? And how did such interrelations look like in those European nations that officially were secularized? 

This section enquires into the intercorrelations between religious, national, and social identities, spanning the 19th and 20th centuries. It takes as examples the Nazarenes in Hungary and Serbia and the political catholicism of the Slovenes, Serbian and Bulgarian national-religious figures of memory, Western European research threads on the topic of nation and religion, interconfessional negotiations in communist and post-communist Romania, as well as the muslims/Bosniaks in Southern Serbian Novi Pazar/Sandžak after the Second World War. 

Accomodation, Protest, Resistance: Acting Within and Against Social Structures

Marx by no means identified the „given and handed down circumstances“, which let humans make their own history, yet not of their own free will, with materialistic dialectics of historical circumstantial constraints, but rather with tradition that weighed heavily on the minds of the living, as old names, battle cries, costumes and a borrowed language taken over from the past - that is to say with a symbolic and discursive tradition. 

This methodological flash of inspiration has not been taken up neither by history nor by

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90 Egon Pelikan, see notes 73 and 75; Bojan Aleksov, see notes 79 and 86.


92 Helke Stadtland, Geschichte der Ökumene als transnationale religiöse Bewegung in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts, research project, Bochum University.


historiography during the centuries that followed. Only since approximately two and a half decades questions have come to the fore about the relationship between structure and agency, the post-structuralist discourse analysis, memory research, as well as the significance of symbols and rituals as system of reference that provide meaning. The significance of crises and radical change as catalysts and focal points for the construction and articulation of the nation and as constitutive moments of nation-building within all European national movements has already been emphasized. Accordingly, panel 5 explores in a concentrated manner the field of tension of accommodation, protest, and resistance within varying social structures, by means of micro-historic, actor- and life-world-centered case studies.

Durkheim noted that „social facts“ were „in a certain sense [...] independent from individuals“ and stood „outside the individual consciousness“, because they were not created by an isolated individual, but rather by communicative interaction. This concerns the constitutive factors for the creation of social reality in the Weberian sense, i.e. the collective patterns of interpretations that mold into patterns of thought and attitude, into mentalities of individuals and groups. The struggle for an adequate relation between structure and agency should, however, not lead from the reductionist, i.e. exclusively collective identity categories of older social history and particularly workers’ history to its radical opposite, i.e. a merely subjective and individualistic approach. Rather, the contributions to this panel integrate social and cultural history and combine macro and micro history, structure and agency. On the background of socioeconomic and sociopolitical contexts they unfold the “interrelations between structures and individual thought and action” in non-democratic (durchherrschte) societies. State (and other institutional) power as social practice manifests itself in a plurifold field of tension and stands at the center of attention: The relationships within a given social group are investigated, i.e. forms of communication, solidarity, competition, power, work and cooperation, and at the same time also the power, market, work, and social relationships between different social groups. The intersection of such an analysis of structures that become apparent in individual actions is constituted by the search for the Eigen-Sinn (approx. willful obstinacy) of the protagonists, and for their exploring of potentials within given social, communicative, and power systems.

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97 Hirschhausen, Leonhard, Europäische Nationalismen im West-Ost-Vergleich, p. 40ff.
102 Cf. Jürgen Kocka, Eine durchherrschte Gesellschaft, in: Hartmut Kaebble et al. (eds.), Sozialgeschichte der
With regard to the Balkans, the handling of and the acting against social structures has hardly been taken up by scholars. Such topics mostly were contextualized - if not instrumentalized - within the framework of social, institutional, political or national history. Yet, it seems a crucial question, if and how ethnic and national affiliations and patterns of solidarity stood crosswise to their social pendants. The chance for a “sober historical analysis of forms of work, production relationships, forms of life, constructions of identity […] of important social groups of modern society, that increasingly have to be regarded as integral parts of this society” has only rarely been taken up for Southeastern Europe. For the rest of Eastern Europe, they likewise are new, and within the Western European scholarly landscape they are no older than a decade and a half.

The contributions to this panel arch from the peasant uprisings in transleithanian Croatia-Slavonia and the role of violence in the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 19th century
to the establishment of cooperativism in inter-war Bulgaria\textsuperscript{111} and the process of collectivization in Romania after the Second World War\textsuperscript{112}, and lastly to the spaces of action of Basque cultural associations in Franco’s Spain\textsuperscript{113} as well as of student organisations in Papadopulos’ Greece.\textsuperscript{114}

This outline of the clustering of the conference’s panels with regard to central tropes of European social history vividly demonstrates, inhowfar the existing scholarly interconnections between the conference participants carry potentials for establishing and fostering interdisciplinary communication. I am confident that the negotiation and definition of research desiderata and of cooperative ventures, with the goal of incorporating Southeastern European history into overall European history, will be conducted on solid grounds and will serve as a significant impulse.

\textsuperscript{111} Andreas Helmedach, Reaya, Gewalt und staatliche Ordnung im europäischen Teil des Osmanischen Reiches vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zu den Balkankriegen, research project.
\textsuperscript{112} Augusta Dimou, Kooperativismus im Bulgarien der Zwischenkriegszeit, research project.
\textsuperscript{114} Konstantinos Kornetis, Student Resistance to the Greek Military Dictatorship: Subjectivity, Memory, and Cultural Politics, 1967-1974, Ph. D., European University Institute, Florence 2006; cf. also Mogens Pelt, Tying Greece to the West: American, West German, Greek Relations 1945-1974, Copenhagen (in print).