

Revisiting South Eastern Europe: Comparative Social History of the 19th and 20th Centuries

Introduction

*"[...] the non-westerner is always living in another time, even when he is our contemporary"*¹.

A central concern of the conference is to discuss *space*, *time*, and *comparison* as analytical categories for European social history of the 19th and 20th centuries, and to concentrate on the enlargement and enforcement of these categories from a South Eastern European perspective. When Maria Todorova's study „The Trap of Backwardness: Modernity, Temporality, and the Study of Eastern European Nationalism" was published in *Slavic Review* in spring 2005, it provided the first methodological confirmation for the observation which preceded the conception of the conference, that the quite distinct and, at least on the part of the Western side, rarely reflected 'Mental Mapping' with regard to the Balkans is faced with a near to complete gap within empirical comparative modern (social) history. The conference is intended to provide momentum for opening up a discursive platform that "enforces the historian's consciousness of potentials and, at the same time, invites him or her to reflect on his or her own cultural location".² In other words, modifying one of Jürgen Kocka's titles, the conference invites to discuss South Eastern Europe as a challenge for a comparative history of Europe.³

In the following research overview I shall first discuss the mentioned analytical categories (comparison, space, time) and then contextualize the aim and object of the single conference panels.

The volume „Nationalismen in Europa. West- und Osteuropa im Vergleich", edited by Ulrike von Hirschhausen and Jörn Leonhard shows in what ways a collection of comparative and single case studies can be inspiring and profitable for European perspectives as a whole. Moreover, the volume offers a rare example of a balanced interpretative approach to Western and Eastern European nationalisms, once more excluding, however, the European Southeast.⁴ In the same volume, Dieter Langewiesche rightly criticizes the fact that compara-

¹ Maria Todorova, *The Trap of Backwardness: Modernity, Temporality, and the Study of Eastern European Nationalism*, in: *Slavic Review* 64/1, 2005, p. 140-164, p. 155. In the following, works by conference participants are emphasized in **bold** printing, in order to illustrate the research cross-section and perspectives they represent.

² Ulrike von Hirschhausen, Jörn Leonhard, *Europäische Nationalismen im West-Ost-Vergleich: Von der Typologie zur Differenzbestimmung*, in: Id. (eds.), *Nationalismen in Europa. West- und Osteuropa im Vergleich*, Göttingen 2001, p. 11-45, p. 12.

³ Jürgen Kocka, *Das östliche Mitteleuropa als Herausforderung für eine vergleichende Geschichte Europas*, in: *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung* 49, 2000, p. 159-174. Wolfgang Höpken, *Zwischen „allgemeiner Geschichtswissenschaft" und historischer Regionaldisziplin: Die südosteuropäische Geschichtswissenschaft heute*, in: *Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen* 46/1, 2006, p. 41-49, offers a short overview of the relationship between research on Southeastern Europe and general historiography, unfortunately largely abstaining from adding bibliographical notes.

⁴ See note 2. Jolanta Sujecka (ed.), *The National Idea as a Research Problem*, Warsaw, 2002, represents a rare example that includes Southeastern Europe into an inner-Eastern Europe comparison without so much as drawing the mental border between East Central Europe and the Balkans, with contributions concerning Poles, Lithuanians, Bulgarians, Macedonians, Ukrainians, Hungarians, Czechs, Kashubes and Buriats. All European regions are also represented from an equal and integrative perspective in Iván Zoltán Dénes (ed.), *Liberty and the Search for Identity. Liberal Nationalisms and the Legacy of Empires*, Budapest 2006 (containing: **Diana Mishkova**, *The Interesting Anomaly of Balkan Liberalism*); as well as Tony Judt, *Postwar. A His-*

tive research tends to either typologize matters in a manner too abstract to “acknowledge in detail the specificities of the single nations and nation states”, or to analyse single cases separately and without connecting them to each other. A comparison of only single aspects of a phenomenon, on the other hand, precludes the possibility to gain an overall picture.⁵ In the conference, the depth of such methodological traps and potentials of comparative research shall be plumbed by assigning an extraordinarily significant space to the chair persons, commentators, and the discussion. The results of such an organisational approach shall then also be present in the planned publication of the proceedings: The case studies shall be complemented and put into context with each other by systematizing contributions.

Much has been said over the last years on historical comparison, its potentials and pitfalls, as well as the necessity to alter and innovate it. However, this criticism of more classical comparative approaches that were conducted from the 1970s onwards was hardly accompanied by accordingly renewed comparative empirical works. As a result, several concepts with sometimes separate, sometimes overlapping meaning emerged, as yet lacking conceptual clarity (*transfer, relational, transnational, entangled history, ‘histoire croisée’,* and others).⁶ At the same time, a vivid discussion on a renewed or enlarged European history in the context of transnational and global historical analytical categories is underway, which is much concerned with Eastern European concepts of space; however, this discussion also largely disregards the East European South.⁷ For Southeastern Europe as a spatial category therefore results particularly valid what Carsten Goehrke and Heiko Haumann have pointed out with regard to Eastern European History as a discipline: It will, they write, “only become superfluous [...], when historians will regard it as natural, both in terms of linguistic qualifications and of cultural dispositions, to research the history of Russia, Hungary or Serbia in the same way as the history of England, France or Switzerland.”⁸

tory of Europe Since 1945, New York 2005. Stefan Troebst and Maria Todorova doubt that findings on the history of communism valid for Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union will prove transferable to Southeastern Europe (<http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/projekte/id=169>).

⁵ Dieter Langewiesche, Staatsbildung und Nationsbildung in Deutschland – ein Sonderweg? Die deutsche Nation im europäischen Vergleich, in: Hirschhausen, Leonhard, Nationalismen in Europa, p. 49-67, p. 49f.

⁶ Cf. the concise overview by Hartmut Kaelble, <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/forum/2005-02-002>, who sums up the most important methodological spurs within comparative history. From the huge literature it might suffice to mention Hannes Siegrist, Rolf Petri (eds.), Probleme und Perspektiven der Europa-Historiographie. Comparativ 14/3, 2004; Hartmut Kaelble, Jürgen Schriewer (eds.), Vergleich und Transfer. Komparatistik in den Sozial-, Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften, Frankfurt a. M. 2003; Hartmut Kaelble, Der historische Vergleich. Eine Einführung zum 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt a. M. 1999; **Heinz-Gerhard Haupt**, Jürgen Kocka (eds.), Geschichte und Vergleich. Ansätze und Ergebnisse international vergleichender Geschichtsschreibung. Frankfurt a. M. 1996, insbes. p. 9-45; **John Breuilly**, Labour and Liberalism in Nineteenth Century Europe. Essays in Comparative History, Manchester 1992, esp. the introduction, p. 1-25. From an Eastern European viewpoint **Constantin Iordachi**, Entangled Histories: Re-writing the History of Central and Southeastern Europe From a Relational Perspective, in: European Studies 4, 2004, p. 113-147.

⁷ See the forum „Zur Europäizität des östlichen Europa“, <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/index.asp?id=744&pn=texte>, where further relevant literature is listed. On the South of Eastern Europe within the context of the spatial category *European South* **Andreas Helmedach**, Der Süden im Südosten: Strukturelle Parallelen von zwei Geschichtsregionen, in: Martina Winkler, Frithjof Benjamin Schenk (eds.), Der Süden Europas - Strukturraum, Wahrnehmungsraum, Handlungsraum?, Frankfurt a.M. 2006 (in print); the conference report can be found at <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/tagungsberichte/id=728>.

⁸ Carsten Goehrke, Heiko Haumann, Osteuropa und Osteuropäische Geschichte. Konstruktionen – Geschichtsbilder – Aufgaben. Ein Beitrag aus Schweizer Sicht, in: Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 52/4,

„The differing forms of the interpretative pattern *nation* in Western and Eastern Europe indeed incite scholars to use the potentials of systematic comparison.“⁹ What is more, the conference will go beyond and contextualize other crucial phenomena of modern history, like *religion, confession, fascism, communism*, and their saturation with *nation*. In short: It will add Southeastern European perspectives to several central research tropes of social history.¹⁰ Finally, the significance of regional and local identity affiliations shall be taken into account, especially in the “European in-between-spaces” (“europäische Zwischenräume”), which are particularly apt for a geographically focussed comparison of various national groups, as well as of the fields of tension between national, regional, and local articulations of identity.¹¹

The concept of *identity*¹² – the understanding of one’s self, and the orientation given to one’s life – on the one hand is connected to a sense of certainty and inner stability. On the other hand it contains aspects of flowing and multiple categories of belonging. Moreover, personal identity, which generally refers to the image that a person possesses of him- or herself, is to be differentiated from the rootedness of such individual identities in collective contexts.¹³ In order to create such collective contexts, reference systems derived from his-

2004, p. 585-596, p. 591.

⁹ Hirschhausen, Leonhard, *Europäische Nationalismen im West-Ost-Vergleich*, p. 12.

¹⁰ On the whole, South Eastern Europe is scarcely touched upon in existing research. Cf. Peter Apor, **Constantin Iordachi** (eds.), *Social (Trans)formations in East-Central Europe, 1918-1968*, Budapest 2006 (in print); **Sorin Antohi**, *The Social Sciences and the Humanities in Central and Eastern Europe: Recent Trends and Opportunities*, in: Quirin Schiermeier, Judith Ockenden (eds.), *Perspectives of Science in Central and Eastern Europe. Emerging Directions from the Past Ten Years*, Amsterdam u. a. 2001, p. 159-172; Manfred Hildermeier et al. (eds.), *Europäische Zivilgesellschaft in Ost und West. Begriff, Geschichte, Chancen*, Frankfurt a. M. 2000; **Lutz Klinkhammer** et al. (ed.), *Europäische Sozialgeschichte. Festschrift für Wolfgang Schieder*, Berlin 2000.

¹¹ Holm Sundhausen, Philipp Ther (eds.), *Regionale Bewegungen und Regionalismen in europäischen Zwischenräumen seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Marburg 2003; as well as the bibliographical report in Jürgen Osterhammel, *Die Wiederkehr des Raumes: Geopolitik, Geohistoire und historische Geographie*, in: *Neue Politische Literatur* 43, 1998, p. 374-97. See also **Sacha Zala**, **Andrea Tognina** (eds.), *Tra confini e frontiera. Rapporti tra territori, lingue, religioni e stati. Il caso del Grigioni italiano dal XII al XX secolo* [Between state borders and border area. Relations between territories, languages, religions and states. The case of the Italian Grisons between the 12th and the 20th century], Bellinzona 2006; Marina Cattaruzza (ed.), *Nazionalismi di frontiera. Identità contrapposte sull'Adriatico nord-orientale 1850-1950* [Border nationalisms. Contested identities in the Northeastern Adriatic], Soveria Mannelli 2003, containing: **Vanni d'Alessio**, *Italiani e croati a Pisino tra fine Ottocento e inizio Novecento: la costruzione delle identità conflittuali* [Italians and Croats in Pisino at the turn of the century: the construction of conflicting identities], p. 73-121, and **Sabine Rutar**, *Le costruzioni dell'io e dell'altro nella Trieste asburgica: i lavoratori e le nazionalità* [The constructions of the *Self* and the *Other* in Habsburg Trieste: the workers and the nationalities], p. 23-46; Angelo Ara, Eberhard Kolb (eds.), *Grenzregionen im Zeitalter der Nationalismen: Elsaß-Lothringen, Trient-Triest, 1870-1914*, Berlin 1998 (ital. orig. 1995); **Andreas Helmedach**, *Der eiserne Vorhang und seine Raumwirksamkeit am Beispiel Triest*, in: Cay Lienau (ed.), *Raumstrukturen und Grenzen in Südosteuropa*, München 2001, p. 59-90; **Heinz-Gerhard Haupt** et al. (eds.), *Regional and National Identities in Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, Den Haag et al. 1998; Alon Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany and National Memory, 1871-1918*, Chapel Hill 1997.

¹² Recently surfeit was expressed with regard to this concept, cf. Lutz Niethammer, *Kollektive Identität. Heimliche Quellen einer unheimlichen Konjunktur*, Reinbek 2000, who calls it a „plastic word“ deprived of any meaning. Yet neither does he offer a useful substitute, nor does it seem that attempts at actually avoiding the word prove productive, as e. g. in Dieter Langewiesche, *Staatsbildung und Nationsbildung in Deutschland*, p. 60 and passim, since his mere translation into German („Selbstbilder“) does not really provide any semantic innovation. What seems important is to define the concept – like all others – in a conclusive and operational manner.

¹³ Peter Wagner, *Soziologie der Moderne. Freiheit und Disziplin*, Frankfurt a.M./New York 1995, p. 98ff.

tory and conveying meaning, like signs, symbols, rituals, and myths, are employed and serve to reduce complexity. The invented and constructed parts – Hobsbawm’s “invention of tradition”¹⁴ are not to be over-estimated or even considered in the absolute, since traditions are constructed from “historical settings”, from a “peculiar mixture of remembrance and oblivion”, and are by no means arbitrary, as they, if they want to be successful, have to “take into account the social framework as well as cultural values and needs.”¹⁵ A plausible explanation for the specific effectiveness of national identity seems to be that it is compatible with other loyalties and dispositions, working in them and through them. This thesis that national affiliation is particularly capable of connecting to central socioeconomic processes and of gaining momentum in them and through them, however, disregards the fact that events, characters, and symbols that carry national value in a given milieu might not pertain this value when transferred to a different social milieu. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Charlotte Tacke consider the question of “how the offers of national identification were understood and adapted by various social groups [as] yet largely unanswered”.¹⁶

With reference to Stefan Troebst, concepts of historical space are defined as „a historiographic transnational-comparative method”, as “a heuristic trick apt to provide mesoregions that are non-territorialized and limited in time, yet comprehensive in terms of states, societies, nations, or even civilizations, and can serve as working hypotheses of comparative research, in order to establish and delimit specific spatial clusters with structural long-durée characteristics from each other. It is not the single characteristics that are unique and therefore specific for a certain cluster, but their combination.”¹⁷ The conference will make use of the potentials of comparative research: 1) To formulate questions that possibly would have never occurred without comparison; 2) to possibly correct wrong assumptions; 3) to define possible research topics; 4) to widen the general perspective, yet without losing sight of empirical detail.¹⁸

In the face of the mentioned “mental mapping” with regard to the Balkans it seems indispensable to problematize the categories of space and time that shape – or could shape - historiographic thinking. Hitherto the West mostly has been seen as the model or forerunner of plurifold historical developments, while the East copied and adapted these develop-

¹⁴ Eric J. Hobsbawm, Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge 1983.

¹⁵ **Heinz-Gerhard Haupt**, Charlotte Tacke, *Die Kultur des Nationalen. Sozial- und kulturgeschichtliche Ansätze bei der Erforschung des europäischen Nationalismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, in: Wolfgang Hardtwig, Hans-Ulrich Wehler (eds.), *Kulturgeschichte heute*, Göttingen 1996, p. 255-283, p. 265. The authors rightly point out that an adequate analysis of these processes of success or failure in the construction of national identity needs to consider not only what is remembered from the past, but also what is left to oblivion.

¹⁶ **Haupt**, Tacke, *Kultur des Nationalen*, p. 266ff. Yet Vernon Lidtke, *The Alternative Culture. Socialist Labour in Imperial Germany*, Oxford 1985, does already give an answer that goes beyond the sketchy for the German workers’ movement. More extensively, Axel Körner, *Das Lied von einer anderen Welt. Kulturelle Praxis im französischen und deutschen Arbeitermilieu 1840–1890*, Frankfurt a. M./New York 1997; and for East Central and Southeastern Europe the case of the social democratic movement in Trieste is analysed in **Sabine Rutar**, *Kultur - Nation - Milieu. Sozialdemokratie in Triest vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg*, Essen 2004.

¹⁷ Stefan Troebst, *Region und Epoche statt Raum und Zeit – „Ostmitteleuropa“ als prototypische geschichtsregionale Konzeption*, <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/forum/2006-05-001>. This essentially corresponds to what **Holm Sundhausen**, *Europa balcanica. Der Balkan als historischer Raum Europas*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 25/4, 1999, p. 626-653, has proposed for a process-oriented construction of the Balkans as a space *sui generis* by means of clustering specific features.

¹⁸ **Thomas Welskopp**, *Stolpersteine auf dem Königsweg. Methodenkritische Anmerkungen zum internationalen Vergleich in der Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, in: *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 35, 1995, p. 339-367, esp. p. 363ff.

ments. It suffices to name the example of the spatial category *nation state*: While Great Britain and France indeed possess a statehood that much earlier could be defined as national than that of their Southeastern pendants, Germany and Italy in many respects are “more Eastern European” than several Southeastern European states. At least two of them, Greece and Serbia, obtained statehood one or two generations earlier, and Romania’s unity and Bulgaria’s sovereignty were achieved practically contemporaneously. What is more, the premise of an original matrix, against which anything that follows is to be matched, and the consequential feeling of backwardness are not characteristics that pertain exclusively to Southeastern European historiography. For decades it shaped German self-definitions. The mental matrix that was an effect of the Cold War “forced” Germany, as it were, to always compare to the rest of the “West” and consequently perceive itself as “belated”. Omitted was the fact that the German founding of a nation state typologically is to be connected to the Italian variant, but also to the successor states of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires.¹⁹

Frequently, explanatory approaches and typologies of nationalisms reach their limits when it comes to applying the theory to Eastern and especially Southeastern Europe.²⁰ Sometimes, such typologies outrightly exclude Eastern Europe from European history with the cliché of two millennia of separate civic development after the division of the Roman Empire.²¹ Instead of a qualitative difference defined by temporal precedence in approaching Western and Eastern Europeans, which a priori turns the first into progressive inventors of ideas and the latter into derivatives and exporters, Todorova pleads for discarding calendrical hierarchies and the underlying matrix of primacy and derivative, and instead point out the basic similarity of all human societies. Nationalism can then be understood as an „almost synchronous rearrangement of group solidarities in human society”: “As a global social process that is itself a by-product of urbanization, bureaucratization, the revolution in communications, and so on, it is intimately linked to modernity.”²² *Synchronous* here does not mean *contemporary* in a mechanical sense, but rather *relative* within a long *durée* frame-

¹⁹ Cf. among others Dieter Langewiesche, *Staatsbildung und Nationsbildung in Deutschland*, p. 61; Reinhart Koselleck, *Deutschland – eine verspätete Nation*, in: Id., *Zeitschichten. Studien zur Historik*, Frankfurt am Main 2000, p. 359-380; **Thomas Welskopp**, *Identität ex negativo. Der „deutsche Sonderweg“ als Metaerzählung in der bundesdeutschen Geschichtswissenschaft der siebziger und achtziger Jahre*, in: Konrad H. Jarausch, Martin Sabrow (eds.), *Die historische Meistererzählung. Deutungslinien der deutschen Nationalgeschichte nach 1945*, Göttingen 2002, p. 109-139. Interestingly, such hierarchies are provided with a question mark in economic history, where they might be empirically easier to prove, cf. **Dieter Ziegler**, Hartmut Berghoff (eds.), *Pionier und Nachzügler? Vergleichende Studien zur Geschichte Großbritanniens und Deutschlands im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung. Festschrift für Sidney Pollard zum 70. Geburtstag*, Bochum 1995, esp. **Id.**, *Pionier und Nachzügler. Kategorien für den deutsch-britischen Vergleich*.

²⁰ For example Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford 2006²/1983. Gellner sees nationalism as a product of modernity, and as such inextricably linked to industrialization. This approach disregards both the national movements in the primarily agrarian societies of Eastern Europe and the fact that nationally motivated unrest was in fact present in the non-industrialized areas of, for example, Spain and Italy. Cf. **John Breuilly**, Introduction, in: *ibid.*, p. XIII-LIII. An analogous criticism is to be found in Hirschhausen, Leonhard, *Europäische Nationalismen im West-Ost-Vergleich*, p. 22, who add that „the relatively long lack of a mass nationalism in highly industrialized England“ does not fit into Gellner’s pattern, either.

²¹ Cf. for example Hagen Schulze, *Staat und Nation in der europäischen Geschichte*, München, 1994, p. 17: „I consider it plausible that, since the division of the continent into a Western and an Eastern Roman Empire around 330 a. d., two European civilizational spheres have developed, which, for about two millenia and up to our present, have developed next to each other, not without interaction, yet without any real merging.

²² Todorova, *The Trap of Backwardness*, p. 149f.

work inspired by Braudel, i. e. a historical period – the age of nationalism, lasting until today – in which differing paths of development can be treated as relatively synchronous.²³

The plea to no longer describe a period of time or a long *durée* phenomenon simply as a linear and consecutive process, but rather as an interconnected one, corresponds to Koselleck's concept of the *non-contemporaneous of the contemporaneous* (die *Ungleichzeitigkeit des Gleichzeitigen*), i. e. the postulated existence of several "layers of time of differing duration and varying origins, which however are contemporaneously present and effective" and should be applied impartially from a more complex perspective rather than on the basis of hierarchically arranged West-East-patterns.²⁴ Referring to the example of Riga, Hirschhausen/Leonhard also ascertain that in the city existed "a pronounced contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous with regard to the interrelation of industrial modernization and nation-building [...], when in the industrialized space that Riga was a nationalized concept of class of the Latvians clashed with the traditional concept of estates of the Germans", and conclude: "Consequently the investigation of single cases does not deliver any argument for a specific West-East-slope, according to which industrial "backwardness" without further ado can be applied as an explanation for "belated" nationalism, for example in Russia. Backwardness as an isolated socioeconomic criterion thus cannot convincingly be applied as a comparative tool within the history of European nationalisms."²⁵

„Even today, when a Frenchman is socialized to Voltaire, he has to *learn* him anew; Voltaire is not in his blood. What makes this socialization process different for a Pole or a Hungarian today?"²⁶ Todorova asks, and pleads for rendering the categories *West* and *East* more dynamic and for regarding them as spaces and times with equal rights and with huge unexploited potential for comparison: „After all [...] peasants were turned not only into Greeks, Serbs, or Bulgarians, but also into Frenchmen."²⁷ This would then also permit to change direction: Byron and Pushkin can hardly be understood without considering Greek nationalism; the Polish divisions and the nationalism that resulted from them influenced Rousseau and many others; German folklore is incomprehensible without its connections to Serbia.²⁸ Not lastly, it is a goal of the conference to locate and explore the potentials of such changes of direction.

Having put these basic thoughts first, I will now summarize the reflections that preceded the organisation of the panels, in order to elucidate the thematic range with regard to central tropes of European history, as well as their clustering into sections. Thereby I contem-

²³ Todorova, *ibid.*, p. 150, mentions the example of the Hilandar-priest Paisii who wrote a Slavo-Bulgarian history in 1762, which later was to be of eminent influence. Evidently, he had had no access to nationally inspired texts in French, English, German, or Russian language. This early evidence of Bulgarian nationalism cannot be understood on the matrix of original and copy. Instead, a mental pattern of unifying modern structural characteristics in relative synchronicity with each other easily comes to terms with the Bulgarian monch.

²⁴ Koselleck, *Zeitschichten*, p. 9. The concept refers back to Ernst Bloch, *Erbschaft dieser Zeit*, Frankfurt 1962, p. 104 and *passim*.

²⁵ Hirschhausen, Leonhard, *Europäische Nationalismen im West-Ost-Vergleich*, p. 22.

²⁶ Todorova, *The Trap of Backwardness*, p. 154.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 154, with reference to Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914*, Stanford 1976. Very graphic results Todorova's example of the historical development of agriculture from Southwestern Asia to the Balkans and from there to the European Northwest in the course of 4000 years. „[...] once the process is completed“, she asks, „does it matter where it originated and by whom? Just imagine Saddam Hussein commenting on the derivative character of agriculture on the British isles...“ (p. 156).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

poraneously display the state of the art of (comparative) social history of the 19th and 20th centuries, from an interdisciplinary and Southeastern European perspective.

Mental Maps of the Self and the Other

We will start with a discussion of cognitive maps: those the West fosters about the Balkans, those the Balkans foster about the Balkans, as well as those the Balkans foster about the West. Maria Todorova's 'Imagining the Balkans' and the subsequent debate with Holm Sundhaussen ignited a small boom of the topic of mental maps about and within Southeastern Europe,²⁹ which however, and understandably so, was only marginally received by scholars working on Western European topics.³⁰ From the claim to dispose of the subject "Eastern European History" as a separate discipline³¹ to the so called *spatial turn*, i. e. rather the innovated structuring of historical spaces³², the debate rather concentrates on Eastern Europe beyond its Southeastern part.

The mentioned consciousness of a "temporal lag" and "lack", inherent both in Western accounts of non-Western nationalisms and in the self-portrayals of the non-Western world, almost inevitably depicts these nationalisms as immature, young, out of control, or, since they are transplanted from their original setting, as inapt for the new context and therefore degenerated: The non-Western world lives in a time that lies always and by definition "behind" the West.³³ In a synthesis of the previous debate, Holm Sundhaussen recently has pointed out the "intertwining of mental map and historical region".³⁴ It is just that which we shall problematize. On the whole, it seems that, indeed, the field of tension between processes of perception and construction with regard to Southeastern Europe and its definition as a spatial category, i. e. the search for structural anchor points and commonalities, could be conducive for future comparative research.

Those responsible for the postulated backwardness are to be found in the region itself: the Habsburgs, the Ottomans, the Romanovs, the Soviets. An exception is to be found in the case of Turkey, where the last century of Ottoman history rather is seen as a quasi-colony of the West. In the rest of Eastern Europe, imperial power and Soviet communism are seen as having inhibited the region to undergo its own evolution within its own organic space –

²⁹ Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, New York 1997; **Holm Sundhaussen**, *Europa balcanica. Der Balkan als historischer Raum Europas*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 25/4, 1999, p. 626-653; Maria Todorova, *Der Balkan als Analysekategorie: Grenzen, Raum, Zeit*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 28/3, 2002, p. 470-492; **Holm Sundhaussen**, *Der Balkan: Ein Plädoyer für Differenz*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 29/4, 2003, p. 608-624.

³⁰ An exception is the bibliographic report by Frithjof Benjamin Schenk, *Mental Maps. Die Konstruktion von geographischen Räumen in Europa seit der Aufklärung*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 28/3, 2002, p. 493-514. Schenk is an expert on Eastern Europe and, in his essay, includes all European regions.

³¹ Jörg Baberowski, *Das Ende der Osteuropäischen Geschichte*, in: *Osteuropa* 48/8-9, 1998, p. 784-799; cf. the controversial discussion in Stefan Creutzberger u. a. (eds.), *Wohin steuert Osteuropa? Eine Diskussion*, Köln 2000.

³² Karl Schlögel, *Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit. Über Zivilisationsgeschichte und Geopolitik*, München, Wien 2003.

³³ Todorova, *The Trap of Backwardness*, p. 145.

³⁴ **Holm Sundhaussen**, *Die Wiederentdeckung des Raums: Über Nutzen und Nachteil von Geschichtsregionen*, in: Konrad Clewing, Oliver Jens Schmitt (eds.), *Südosteuropa. Von vormoderner Vielfalt und nationalstaatlicher Vereinheitlichung. Festschrift für Edgar Hoesch*, München 2005, p. 13-34, p. 30.

Europe. The backwardness hence is artificial, and the future foresees an acceleration of time, a catching-up with what could have long since been. Europe's past in this way becomes Eastern Europe's future. In fact, the postulate of original and copy only makes sense when empirical research manages to show direct influence and patterns of communication and transfer, like for example the influence of Czech education and schooling on the Slovak society, or the Greek on the Bulgarian. Beyond this any postulated primacy has to remain immaterial: a mental map.³⁵

A discussion of mental dispositions in the framework of present transformational processes and the project of vaulting, normative European union will constitute the entry into problematizing methodological potentials, pitfalls and research desiderata when it comes to comparative history with a Southeastern European focus. Even after the end of the Cold War a tendency has remained valid to take Western European civil society as a yardstick for a higher European integrative model, which, once again, does not do justice to the multi-layered and controversial nature of European comparative aspects. Moreover, the teleological tendency to stylize the post-1945 process of European unification as a peek of a century-old development, instead of emphasizing its constructed nature, also operates with normative, ideal typologies.³⁶ For Eastern Europe another aspect has to be considered: With the end of Czechoslovakia in 1992 the last of the successor states of the First World War disappeared from the map. This end of the "age of successor states" also offers the chance to pose research questions in a way as to de-emphasize any relevance of whether the constructors of these states were "successful" or not.³⁷ On the whole, what is differentiated here is Jürgen Kocka's observation that we should "enquire into the differing paths towards civil society in Europe and attempt at reaching a typology of paths, instead of declaring a normative path, from which the others are only derivatives."³⁸

In addition, objections have to be raised against a more recent mental map: The extraordinary Yugoslav situation often – in reanimation or perpetuation of the powder keg cliché – was externalized and sold in an unreflected and unacceptable manner as "Balkans".³⁹ Taking

³⁵ Todorova, *The Trap of Backwardness*, p. 160.

³⁶ Pointed the criticism of „European“ history writing, teleological-political projects and mental dispositions in **Augusta Dimou**, *European History and European Stories. Ironic Encounters Between the Canon and the Fringes*, in: Silvia Marton (ed.), *Europe in Its Making*, Iași 2006. Cf. Stuart Woolf, *Europa und seine Historiker*, in: *Comparativ* 14/3, 2004. *Probleme und Perspektiven der Europa-Historiographie*, p. 50-71; **Holm Sundhassen** (ed.), *Osteuropa zwischen Integration und Differenz. Probleme europäischer Integration und kultureller Differenzierung*, Frankfurt a. M. u. a. 1999; **Wim van Meurs** (ed.), *Prospects and Risks of EU Enlargement. Southeastern Europe: Weak States and Strong International Support*, Opladen 2003; **ders.**, **Alexandros Yannis** (ed.), *The European Union and the Balkans. From Stabilisation Process to Southeastern Enlargement*, Gütersloh 2002. **Guido Franzinetti**, *Diritti e conflitti: Irlanda del Nord, Cipro e FYROM [Rights and Conflicts: Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and the 'Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia']*, in: Maria Cristina Ercolessi (ed.), *Stati e micropolitica dei conflitti [States and micropolitics of conflicts]*, Neapel 2002, p. 117-128, hints at the fact that conflicting societies within the European process of unification do bear comparative potentials between the West and the Southeast.

³⁷ Almost all of the presently existing Central European and Southeast European states can refer to an existence prior to 1918. Cf. **Guido Franzinetti**, *The Austrian Littoral in a Cisleithanian Perspective*, in: *Actae Histriae* 14/1, 2006 (forthcoming).

³⁸ Kocka, *Das östliche Mitteleuropa als Herausforderung*, p. 172; similar Langewiesche, *Staatsbildung und Nationsbildung in Deutschland*, p. 66f.

³⁹ **Guido Franzinetti**, *I conflitti balcanici e le "nuove guerre" [The Balkan conflicts and the „new wars“]*, in: William Bonapace, Maria Perino (eds.), *Srebrenica, fine secolo – Nazionalismi, intervento internazionale, società civile [Srebrenica, turn of the century – nationalisms, international intervention, civic society]*, Novi Ligure, 2005, p. 63-74; **Holm Sundhassen**, *Der „wilde“ Balkan: Imagination und Realität einer europäischen*

spur of present debates, the introductory panel to Western-Southeastern European comparisons focuses on the former Yugoslavia⁴⁰ and Turkey / the Ottoman Empire⁴¹, as well as on a change of perspective, i. e. Balkan occidentalism.⁴²

Fascism, War, and Society: Yugoslavia, Romania, France, Italy

The more recent debate on the characteristics of totalitarian or authoritarian societies⁴³ and the gains and risks of comparing them concentrates on several topical tropes: the comparison of fascisms, mostly its Italian and German variants, the systemic comparison of national socialism and communism, the latter mostly in its stalinist variant, as well as the specific case of comparing the national socialist and the communist German states.⁴⁴ Here

Krisenregion, in: *Ost-West. Europäische Perspektiven* 1/1, 2000, p. 3-15; Florian Bieber, *Europa ohne Balkan? Überlegungen zu den Auswirkungen der Kriege im ehemaligen Jugoslawien auf die Konzeption des Balkans in der westlichen Politik und Öffentlichkeit*, in: *Jahrbücher für Geschichte und Kultur Südosteuropas* 1, 1999, p. 129-138; and from a broader perspective **Andreas Helmedach** (ed.), *Pulverfass, Powder Keg, Baril de Poudre. Südosteuropa im europäischen Geschichtsschulbuch*, Hannover 2006 (in print); **Sorin Antohi**, *Habits of the Mind. Europe's Post-1989 Symbolic Geographies*, in: **Id.**, Vladimir Tismaneanu (eds.), *Between Past and Future. The Revolutions of 1989 and their Aftermath*, Budapest 2000, p. 61-77.

⁴⁰ **Daniel Šuber**, *Nationale Identität und Erinnerungspolitik in Serbien*, Ph. D. project Konstanz University; **Id.**, *Kollektive Erinnerung und nationale Identität in Serbien. Zu einer kulturalistischen Interpretation des Anfangs vom Ende Jugoslawiens*, in: Bernhard Giesen, Christoph Schneider (ed.), *Tätertrauma. Nationale Erinnerungen im öffentlichen Diskurs*, Konstanz 2004, p. 347-379; **Heike Karge**, *Steinerne Erinnerung - versteinerte Erinnerung? Kriegsgedenken im sozialistischen Jugoslawien*, Ph. D., European University Institute, Florence 2006; **Id.**, *Geschichtsbilder im postjugoslawischen Raum: Konzeptionen in Geschichtslehrbüchern am Beispiel von Selbst- und Nachbarschaftswahrnehmung*, in: *Internationale Schulbuchforschung* 21/4, 1999, p. 315-37; **Vanni d'Alessio**, **Eric Gobetti**, *Politics of Identity and Symbolism in Post-War Mostar*, research project, Universities of Naples and Turin; cf. **Holm Sundhaussen**, *Die "Genozidnation": serbische Selbst- und Fremdbilder*, in: Nikolaus Buschmann, Dieter Langewiesche (eds.), *Der Krieg in den Gründungsmythen europäischer Nationen und der USA*, Frankfurt a. M., New York 2004, p. 351-371.

⁴¹ **Vangelis Kechriotis**, *Greek-Orthodox, Ottoman Greeks or just Greeks? Theories of Coexistence in the Aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution*, in: *Balkan Studies* 1, 2005, p. 51-72; **Seçil van het Hof-Deren**, *Continuity and Discontinuity in Turkish National Identity*, Ph. D. project, Leiden University; **Id.** *From pan-Islamism to Turkish nationalism: modernisation and German influence in the late Ottoman period*, in: Marco Dogo, **Guido Franzinetti** (eds.), *Disrupting and Reshaping. Early Stages of Nation-Building in the Balkans*, Ravenna 2002, p. 117-139. Cf. **Fikret Adanir**, Klaus Schneiderheinze, *Das Osmanische Reich als orientalische Despotie in der Wahrnehmung des Westens*, in: Elçin Kürsat-Ahlers u. a. (ed.), *Türkei und Europa. Facetten einer Beziehung in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, Frankfurt a. M. 2001, p. 83-122; and **Fikret Adanir**, Suraiya Faroqhi (eds.), *The Ottomans and the Balkans. A Discussion of Historiography*, Leiden 2002.

⁴² **Diana Mishkova**, *Europe in the Nineteenth-Century Balkans. A Case Study in the Cultural Transfer of a Concept*, in: *Revue des études sud-est européennes* 42/1-4, 2004, p. 183-200; **Id.**, *In the Mirror of Balkanism: Imagining Europe in the Nineteenth-Century Balkans*. Research Paper Published by the Nexus Project, Sofia 2003.

⁴³ Cf. the overview in Detlef Schmiechen-Ackermann, *Diktaturen im Vergleich*, Darmstadt 2006; as well as Juan J. Linz, *Totalitäre und autoritäre Regime*, Berlin 2000, who divides non-democratic systems into „totalitarian“ and „authoritarian“ regimes. The latter group is constituted by variations of military dictatorships, developing dictatorships and post-totalitarian regimes.

⁴⁴ Cf. Schmiechen-Ackermann, *Diktaturen im Vergleich*, p. 68-142; furthermore the plea for comparison in Imanuel Geiss, *Die Totalitarismen unseres Jahrhunderts. Kommunismus und Nationalsozialismus im historisch-politischen Vergleich*, in: Ekkehard Jesse (ed.), *Totalitarismus im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Bilanz der internationalen Forschung*, Baden-Baden 1999², p. 160-175, as well as the general critical overview given by the quite diverging contributions in the same volume. More rarely have been conducted empirical social history analyses of societies which have lived through both national socialism and communism. Cf. for example Eric

also, the inclusion of Southeastern Europe represents a desideratum, and accordingly most of the research presented in this panel is *work in progress* within a field that is just opening up.⁴⁵

During the Cold War, the so-called „debate on totalitarianism“ was characterized by a mixture of empirical-analytical thought and moralizing-normative value-giving. After 1989, efforts to compare national socialism and communism increased. On the one hand, attempts were fuelled to present Hitlerism and Stalinism as equals and turn hierarchies upside down, dispute the uniqueness of the national socialist crimes and centrally put the case for a reckoning of the crimes of communism.⁴⁶ On the other hand the new systemic and mental dispositions as well as newly open archives were taken as an occasion for more pragmatic historiographic inquiries and historicizing the political instrumentalisation of earlier times.⁴⁷ A consequence of the communist imposing of mental parameters is the difficulty of the post-communist societies – and especially those which, today again, are post-war societies, like the Yugoslav successor states – to establish a differentiated and objectified platform for discussion. Instead, here also “good” is turned into “evil” and vice versa.⁴⁸

Comparative history of fascism and national socialism has pointed out typological differences when it comes, for example, to comparing the mechanisms of radicalization in the German occupation policies in Western and Eastern countries. Not least, racial ideologies – mental mapping, if you will – were responsible for this. Yugoslavia’s quick change from friend to foe, for example, can be referred to a *Weltanschauung* in which the Balkans a priori were excluded from European civilization and which was taken over and intensified by national socialism. In Serbia, for instance, several layers of resentment existed: Old conceptions of enmity from Habsburg times and the First World War mixed with the new classification which saw Yugoslavia as belonging to the East. There ensued a brutal policy which did not count - as in France or Italy - on a minimum consensus within the population, but rather on the radicalization of the battle of all against all.⁴⁹

D. Weitz, *Creating German Communism 1890-1990*, Princeton 1997, who investigates into the history of communism in Germany within the varying political systems between 1890 and 1990.

⁴⁵ Since the beginning of 2005, **Wim van Meurs** has been coordinating the project „Captive States, Divided Societies. Political Institutions of Southeastern Europe in Historical Comparative Perspective“ (www.cap-lmu.de/projekte/fge/captivestates/index.php) at the Center for Applied Policy Research in Munich. The project, which is financed by the Volkswagen Foundation, aims at producing a handbook on the political institutions in Southeastern Europe, covering the period of the 19th and 20th centuries as the era of state- and nation-building up to the present transitional phase. Cf. also Erwin Oberländer et al. (eds.), *Autoritäre Regime in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa 1919-1944*, Paderborn u. a. 2001, containing: **Holm Sundhausen**, *Die Königsdiktaturen in Südosteuropa: Umriss einer Synthese*, p. 337-348; and **Milan Ristović**, *General M. Nedić – Diktatur, Kollaboration und die patriarchalische Gesellschaft Serbiens 1941-44*, p. 633-688; Gert Sørensen, Robert Mallet (eds.), *International Fascism 1919-45*, London 2002, containing: Mogens Pelt, *The Establishment and Development of the Metaxas Dictatorship in the Context of Fascism and Nazism 1936-1941*.

⁴⁶ As an example might suffice the controversy around Stéphane Courtois et al. (eds.), *Das Schwarzbuch des Kommunismus. Unterdrückung, Verbrechen und Terror*, München, Zürich 1998⁴. Cf. Jens Mecklenburg, Wolfgang Wippermann (ed.), „Roter Holocaust“? *Kritik des Schwarzbuchs des Kommunismus*, Hamburg 1998; Horst Möller (ed.), *Der rote Holocaust und die Deutschen. Die Debatte um das „Schwarzbuch des Kommunismus*, Zürich 1999.

⁴⁷ Cf. for example Abbott Gleason, *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War*, New York, Oxford 1995; as well as the contributions in Jesse, *Totalitarismus*, with further bibliographical references.

⁴⁸ Cf. the historiographic overviews in Ulf Brunnbauer (ed.), *(Re)Writing History – Historiography in Southeast Europe after Socialism*, Münster 2004.

⁴⁹ **Lutz Klinkhammer**, *Grundlinien nationalsozialistischer Besatzungspolitik in Frankreich, Jugoslawien und Italien*, in: Christof Dipper et al. (eds.), *Faschismus und Faschismen im Vergleich*. Wolfgang Schieder zum 60.

Pierre Bourdieu's reflections result methodologically inspiring. He points out that any communication and any interaction is dependent of its social setting; the same words can obtain different meanings, in accordance with the context in which they are uttered. Moreover, words and concepts can adapt their meaning when transported from one social or ideological setting to another.⁵⁰ Which, then, are the dominant discourses of a given space and time, and which changes do these discourses undergo when breaks in the social contexts occur? How can adequate interpretative categories be found to describe continuities and discontinuities in discourses and actions as part of radicalized and atomized, if not war-torn, societies, characterized both by a polarization of ideologies and by a lowered barrier towards violence?

In accordance with this, the potentials of a life-world centered approach to social settings within totalitarian states move to the center of attention. The biggest advantage of such an approach, so it seems, lies in the fact that it doubts any categorical order or hierarchy of things and events, and with Hannah Arendt emphasizes that the *pretension* for total power represents an ideal type and a potentially omnipresent menace to modernity, rather than an empirically experienced type, which, in fact, has never yet been put into practice.⁵¹ Consequently, individual experiences are to be taken seriously and analysed in interaction with structural and systemic contextualisations.⁵²

The contributions to this panel range from the interwar period to the post-war years and compare the Romanian, Croatian, Serbian, and Italian fascist movements,⁵³ the resettlement policies, resistance and collaboration in Yugoslavia and France,⁵⁴ as well as the end of fascism and the establishment of communism in the Italian-Yugoslav border region.⁵⁵

Geburtstag, Köln 1998, p. 183-213, p. 185-206. From a comparative economic history perspective **Dieter Ziegler** (ed.), *Banken und „Arisierungen“ in Mitteleuropa während des Nationalsozialismus*, Stuttgart 2002; **Id.**, *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2004*, vol. 1: Zwangsarbeit im Nationalsozialismus in den besetzten Gebieten; Harald Wixforth, **Dieter Ziegler** et al. (ed.), *Die Expansion der Dresdner Bank in Europa*, München 2006; **Klaus Tenfelde**, Hans-Christoph Seidel (eds.), *Zwangsarbeit im Bergwerk. Der Arbeitseinsatz im Kohlenbergbau des Deutschen Reiches und der besetzten Gebiete im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg*, 2 vols., Essen 2005.

⁵⁰ Pierre Bourdieu, *Was heißt sprechen? Zur Ökonomie des sprachlichen Tausches*, Wien 2005² (French orig.: *Ce que parler veut dire. L'économie des échanges linguistiques*, Paris 2004/1982).

⁵¹ Hannah Arendt, *Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft*, München 1986/1951, p. 959.

⁵² On the methodological questions regarding such an approach cf. **Sabine Rutar**, *Totalitarian Structures and Social Practice: Deviance in Yugoslavia Between 1941 and 1951*, in: Darko Darovec (ed.), *Rhetoric of Deviance. Criminals, Outlaws, and Deviants in History*, Koper 2007 (in print).

⁵³ **Wim van Meurs**, Daniela Heimerl, *Fascism and Communism as Subversive Political Movements and Alternative Political Cultures in the Interwar Period*, research project in the framework of the project "Captive States, Divided Societies" (see note 45), with case studies from Romania and Croatia; **Ionut Sasu**, *The Metaphysics of Illusion. A Comparative Analysis of the Italian and Romanian Fascist Movements*, M.A. Thesis, Dalarna University, Falun, 2004. On Ustaša a-Croatia cf. also **Eric Gobetti**, *Dittatore per caso. Un piccolo duce protetto dall'Italia fascista* [Dictator by accident. A small „Duce“ protected by fascist Italy], Napoli 2001; **Id.**, *Il tempo delle scelte: 1941-1943: Knin e Mostar fra l'occupazione e la guerra civile* [Time of choices: 1941-43. Knin and Mostar between occupation and civil war], Torino 2003.

⁵⁴ **Alexa Stiller**, *Volkstumspolitik der SS 1939-1945*, Ph. D. project, Hannover University, with a focus on Alsace-Lorraine and Slovenia; **Vesna Drapac**, *The Good, the Bad, and the Uninteresting. A Comparative Analysis Approach Towards Defining Collaboration and Resistance in Occupied France*, in: Robert Aldrich and Martyn Lyons (eds.), *The Sphinx in the Tuileries and Other Essays in Modern French History*, Sydney 1999; **Id.**, *War and Religion. Catholics in the Churches of Occupied Paris*, Washington D. C. 1998. On Yugoslavia cf. **Milan Ristović**, *Nemački „novi poredak“ i Jugoistočna Evropa 1940/41-1944/45: planovi o budućnosti i praksa* [The „New Order“, and Southeastern Europe. Future Plans and Practice], 2005²/1991; **Id.**, *U potrazi za utočistem. Jugoslovenski Jevreji u bekstvu od holokausta 1941-45* [In Search of Refuge. The

Ethnic and Social Affiliations in the „Long“ 19th Century

Dieter Langewiesche's definition of *nation* seems concise and conclusive for all variants of constructing and articulating the nation: He sees it as a system of collectively transferred value and structure parameters that encompass both inclusive and exclusive aspects and hereby constitutively contain offers and claims for participation as well as aggressive potentials.⁵⁶ In varying shades, historiography on the Eastern European nationalisms nearly always refers to the same mental matrix. The actors and promoters of national movements in the best case are interpreted as exporters of a Western ideology, and in the worst as products of big power manipulations. The “belated” carry out mimicry without authentic roots. A further characteristic of this historiography is the dichotomy between a “typically” Western nationalism that strives for a pluralistic society, and a “typically” Eastern nationalism, which is of a cultural nature and consequently rather tends to promote a closed society. In other words: Western nationalism bears a higher potential of participation, while the Eastern variant is prone to a higher potential of aggression.⁵⁷

Eastern European historians regard nationalism as the key topos of modernity and almost exclusively concentrate on the birth, maturation, and victory of national liberation wars, a master narrative which rather leaves other processes and events to oblivion. While these historians reject to interpret the nationalism of “their” countries purely as an export product of a contagious disease, they explicitly or implicitly share the notion that the most important ideological currents of the 18th and 19th centuries – Enlightenment, Romanticism, nationalism, republicanism, socialism etc. – are “Western” ideas transplanted onto Eastern European soil, even if they do not go as far as to regard the outcome of these transplantations as degenerated. This goes hand in hand with the treatment of the organic nation as a

Yugoslav Jews fleeing the Holocaust], Beograd 1998; **Id.**, Long Journey Home. Greek Refugee Children in Yugoslavia 1948-1960, Thessaloniki 2000.

⁵⁵ **Nevenka Troha**, Slovenci in Hrvati v “slovanskih četah” na Sardiniji, Korziki in v južni Franciji (1944-45) [Slovenes and Croats in the „Slav units“ in Sardinia, Corsica, and Southern France], in: Prispjevki za novejšo zgodovino [Contributions to Modern History], 46/1, 2006, p. 351-362; **Id.**, Predlogi Jugoslavije za rešitev tržaškega vprašanja po objavi resolucije Informbiroja / Yugoslav Proposals For the Solution of the Trieste Question Following the Cominform Resolution, in: Jasna Fischer et al. (eds.), Jugoslavija v hladni vojni / Yugoslavia in the Cold War, Ljubljana, Toronto 2004, p. 143-159 u. 161-180; **Id.**, Befreiung oder Okkupation, nationale Befreiung oder Revolution: das Küstenland und Triest im Jahre 1945, in: Zeitgeschichte 27/1, 2000, p. 22-39; **Id.**, Komu Trst? Slovenci in Italijani med dvema državama [Trieste to whom? Slovenes and Italians in between two states], Ljubljana 1999. Cf. Rolf Wörsdörfer, Krisenherd Adria 1915-1955. Konstruktion und Artikulation des Nationalen im italienisch-jugoslawischen Grenzraum, Paderborn 2004. Generally on recent historiography on Italian fascism cf. **Lutz Klinkhammer**, Enzo Collotti, Enzo Collotti im Gespräch mit Lutz Klinkhammer. Zur Neubewertung des italienischen Faschismus, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 26/2, 2000, p. 285-306.

⁵⁶ Dieter Langewiesche, Nationalismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Zwischen Partizipation und Aggression, Berlin 1998. **Id.**, Nation, Nationalismus, Nationalstaat in der europäischen Geschichte seit dem Mittelalter – Versuch einer Bilanz, in: Ders., Nation, Nationalismus, Nationalstaat in der deutschen und europäischen Geschichte, München 2000, p. 14-34, gives an overview of research on European nationalisms.

⁵⁷ Cf. in particular Hans Kohn, Die Idee des Nationalismus. Ursprung und Geschichte bis zur Französischen Revolution, Heidelberg 1950. Later this approach was developed further and refined, yet not really given up. Cf. for example Theodor Schieder, Typologie und Erscheinungsformen des Nationalstaats in Europa (1966), in: **Id.**, Nationalismus und Nationalstaat. Studien zum nationalen Problem im modernen Europa, Göttingen 1992, p. 65-86.

phenomenon existing from times immemorial, for which Western nationalism simply functioned as the *veille*.⁵⁸

Social history research analyzing reactions as well as processes of adaptation and change within various social groups (professional groups, religious groups, generations, gendered groups etc.) is in upturn, as far as Southeastern European societies and their relationships and handling of the nation are concerned; yet it is far from having reached blanket coverage.⁵⁹ Only rarely the fundamental similarity of the phases that nationalizing processes underwent in all European societies have been pointed out, even though both Western and Eastern literature has been providing for this potentiality for a long time.⁶⁰ Equally, the social history writing of the Habsburg Monarchy after 1867 is incomplete, especially when it comes to a systematically comparative approach, be it within the Habsburg lands, be it with other European localities.⁶¹ The comparison of Western and Eastern European na-

⁵⁸ **Augusta Dimou**, „... And Then the Prince Kissed Sleeping Beauty.” Some Thoughts on Popular Narratives of the Wars of Liberation in the Balkans - A Metaphoric Reading of a Metaphor, in: *Jahrbücher für Geschichte und Kultur Südosteuropas* 6, 2004, p. 187-196; **Guido Franzinetti**, Il problema del nazionalismo nella storiografia dell'Europa centro-orientale [The problem of nationalism in East Central European historiography], in: *Rivista storica italiana* 53/3, 1991, p. 812-846. It should be pointed out that nationalism in Western Europe has been treated as a construction and modern phenomenon for no longer than a generation or two of scholarly writing.

⁵⁹ **Vanni d'Alessio**, Istrians, Identifications and the Habsburg Legacy. Perspectives on Identities in Istria, in: *Actae Historiae* 14/1, 2006 (forthcoming); **Id.**, Il Cuore Conteso. Il nazionalismo in una comunità multietnica. L'Istria asburgica [The contested heart. Nationalism in a multiethnic community. The case of Habsburg Istria], Napoli 2003; Oliver Jens Schmitt, *Lebenswelten und Identitäten einer ethnokonfessionellen Gruppe im osmanischen Reich im langen 19. Jahrhundert*, München 2005; Clewing, Schmitt, *Südosteuropa. Von vormoderner Vielfalt und nationalstaatlicher Vereinheitlichung*; **Diana Mishkova**, The Uses of Tradition and National Identity in the Balkans, in: Maria Todorova (ed.), *Balkan Identities. Nation and Memory*, London 2004, p. 269-94; **Id.**, Die Konstruktion nationaler Identität in Bulgarien (1878-1912), in: Hans-Lukas Kieser et al. (ed.), *Konstruktion nationaler Identität und der Umgang mit Geschichte. Thematisches Heft von ,Asien, Afrika, Lateinamerika. Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift*, Berlin 2001; **Id.**, Literacy and Nation-Building in Bulgaria 1878-1912, in: *East European Quarterly* 29/1, 1994, p. 63-93; **Sabine Rutar**, *Kultur - Nation - Milieu*; Meropi Anastasiadou (ed.), *Médecins et ingénieurs ottomans à l'âge des nationalismes*, Paris 2003, containing: **Vangelis Kechriotis**, Between Professional Duty and National Fulfillment: the Smyrniot Medical Doctor Apostolos Psaltoff (1862-1923), p. 331-348; **Andreas Helmedach**, Das Verkehrssystem als Modernisierungsfaktor. Straßen, Post, Fuhrwesen und Reisen nach Triest und Fiume vom Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zum Eisenbahnzeitalter, München 2002; **Constantin Iordachi**, Citizenship, Nation- and State-Building: The Integration of Northern Dobrogea in Romania 1878-1913, in: *Carl Back Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, No. 1607, 2002; **Ulf Brunnbauer (ed.)**, *Umstrittene Identitäten. Ethnizität und Nationalität in Südosteuropa*, Frankfurt a. M. 2002; **Augusta Dimou**, The "Wheel of History", the "Dark Mass" and the Antinomies of Modernity in the Semiperiphery: The 1903 Split in the Bulgarian Social Democracy, in: *Jahrbücher für Geschichte und Kultur Südosteuropas* 3, 2001, p. 79-105; Trencsényi Balázs, **Constantin Iordachi** et al. (eds.), *Nationalism and Contested Identities. Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies*, Budapest, Iași 2001; **Holm Sundhussen**, Wolfgang Höpken (eds.), *Eliten in Südosteuropa. Rolle, Kontinuitäten, Brüche in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, München 1998; **Fikret Adanir**, Socio-political Environment of Balkan Nationalism: the Case of Ottoman Macedonia, 1856-1912, in: **Heinz-Gerhard Haupt** et al. (eds.), *Regional and National Identities in Europe*, p. 221-254.

⁶⁰ To mention only the „classics“ who identified an essentially similar phenomenon – the development from the initial promoters of national thought to the effects the latter had on the so called „masses“ – within different European contexts: Miroslav Hroch, *Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas. Eine vergleichende Analyse zur gesellschaftlichen Schichtung der patriotischen Gruppen*, Prag 1968; Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*; George L. Mosse, *The Nationalisation of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars Through the Third Reich*, New York 1977.

⁶¹ **Guido Franzinetti**, *The Austrian Littoral*; **Id.**, *Sicurezza e diritti sociali in Polonia, Ungheria e Cecoslovacchia, 1918-1939* [Security and social rights in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia], research pro-

tionalisms hence is “a path that scholars until now rarely have pursued”.⁶² What is more, such a comparison must remain shaky without sound knowledge of both objects in question,⁶³ and in fact comparative research has mostly concentrated on inner-regional comparisons of Southeastern Europe.⁶⁴

Social mobilisation on the one hand and the role of political and intellectual elites on the other, as well as the significance of crises and radical changes as catalysts or focal points for the construction and articulation of the nation are common constitutive aspects of nation-building within all European national movements. In the panel on the “long” 19th century these aspects stand at the center of attention. The three case studies from the Ottoman Empire⁶⁵ are sided by an example located at the intersection between Southeastern, East Central, and Western Europe (Trieste)⁶⁶ as well as the Irish nation-building⁶⁷, providing for

ject, University of Eastern Piedmont, Alessandria (period: 2005-2007), concentrates on Habsburg successor states and territories. Cf. however at least **John Breuilly**, *Austria, Prussia and Germany 1806-1871*, London 2001; as well as the 9th volume of „Geschichte der Habsburgermonarchie“, which is being prepared and dedicated to social history. Helmut Rumpler et al. (eds.), *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918*, vol. IX: Sozialgeschichte, containing: **Hannes Grandits**, *Ländliches und städtisches Familienleben im Wandel: die Habsburgermonarchie zwischen 1848 und 1918*.

⁶² Hirschhausen, Leonhard, *Europäische Nationalismen im West-Ost-Vergleich*, p. 12. The volume contains a comprehensive overview of East-West-comparisons, however illustrating once more that Southeastern Europe is almost completely lacking, p. 16-21. But even for their field of investigation the authors point out (p. 10): „Considering the wide range and complexity of research on nationalism, the East-West-comparison undertaken here has to be understood as a symptomatic attempt rather than as a systematic compendium.“ Cf. **Guido Franzinetti** (ed.), *Nazionalismo e mutamento sociale in Europa centro-orientale* [Nationalism and social change in East Central Europe]. *Quaderni storici* 28/84, 1993, with contributions on Galicia, the Balkans, and Finland.

⁶³ Cf. Miroslav Hroch, *Die nationalen Formierungsprozesse in Mittel- und Südosteuropa: Ein Vergleich*, in: *Elitenwandel und Modernisierung in Osteuropa*, *Berliner Jahrbuch für osteuropäische Geschichte* 2, Berlin 1995, p. 7-16, pointedly interpreting Southeastern Europe through the Central European lens. Cf. on the other hand **Fikret Adanir**, Christian Lübke, Michael Müller, Martin Schulze Wessel, *Traditionen und Perspektiven vergleichender Forschung über die historischen Regionen Osteuropas*, in: Michael Müller et al. (eds.), *Osteuropäische Geschichte in vergleichender Sicht. Festschrift für Klaus Zernack zum 65. Geburtstag*, Berlin 1996, p. 11-43, where the collective authorship provides for an interconnection of East Central and Southeastern European perspectives.

⁶⁴ Marco Dogo, **Guido Franzinetti** (eds.), *Disrupting and Reshaping*, where the nation-building processes in Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Turkey are treated as single case studies and with quite diverging approaches (containing: **Guido Franzinetti**, *Nation-building and state-building in the Balkans*; **Seçil Deren**, *From pan-Islamism to Turkish nationalism: modernisation and German influence in the late Ottoman period*; **Diana Mishkova**, *The Nation as Zadruga: Re-mapping Nation-Building in Nineteenth-Century Southeast Europe*); **Diana Mishkova**, *Prisposobiavane na svobodata: Modernost-legitimnost v Srbii i Rumunii prez XIX v.* [The taming of liberty. Modernity and legitimation in Serbia and Romania in the 19th century], Sofia 2001; **Augusta Dimou**, *Diverging Paths to Modernity: Socialism as an Intellectual Movement in the Nineteenth Century. A Comparative Approach*, in: **Fikret Adanir** (ed.), *Social Movements in Southeast Europe. Reassessment of Historiography and Perspectives for Future Research*. *Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen*, 33, 2005, p. 11-30; **Id.**, *Paths Towards Modernity: Intellectuals and the Contextualization of Socialism in the Balkans*, Ph. D., European University Institute, Florence 2003, which compares Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece; **Sabine Rutar**, *Arbeit und Überleben in Jugoslawien. Regionale Bergbaugesellschaften und der Zweite Weltkrieg*, research project, Bochum University, concentrating on Slovene and Serbian case studies.

⁶⁵ **Hakan Erdem** et al. (eds.), *Middle East Historiographies: Narrating the Twentieth Century*, Washington 2006 (forthcoming); **Id.**, *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Its Demise, 1800-1909*, Basingstoke 2001; **Hannes Grandits**, *Herrschaft und Loyalität in der spätosmanischen Gesellschaft (Schwerpunkt Herzegowina)*, research project, Graz University; **Eva Frantz**, *Geschichte Albaniens und des Kosovo im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Nations- und Identitätsbildungsprozesse*, Ph. D. project, Vienna University.

⁶⁶ **Borut Klajčan**, *“Češ koslovaš ko-italijanska mala vojna”: Mednarodne razsežnosti prvega tržaš kega proce-*

a set of multi-layered questions: Which are the structural preconditions for the construction and articulation of national ideas up to the point of their politicization? Where can those structural and chronological non-contemporaneities as well as fractions and threshold eras be located, which provide for re-aligning the relationship between integrative and aggressive elements? Who were the carriers – initiators, activists, multipliers – of nation-building? What differences result from the social profiles of nationalisms? How was the nation articulated and constructed within a given society and its specific ideological lines of conflict? Which was the role of the state as initiator, motor, or catalyst of nation-building? Which interrelations exist between state-intended, official, and non-statal popular nationalism? How about the repression, saturation, overlapping of national and other loyalties, be they of regional, local, social, political or still another nature? Which was the significance of images of the self, the other, the enemy in the varying contexts, and which mechanisms lay at the base of the constructions, perception and the change of such images? What was the role of the connection between war and nation for the nation-building process? How did the non-contemporaneity of the contemporaneous show in border areas and multi-national spaces, as well as in center-periphery relationships?⁶⁸

Religion and Nationality as Cross-Identity Categories

With only slight modifications and supplements, the set of questions sketched above for the context of social and national identities is valid for the construction and articulation of the religious and confessional. While religion for a long time had been regarded rather as a *quantité négligeable* of modern social history, this has changed over the last years, not least in the light of the so called cultural turn: „Religion has moved on the agenda of social history and is increasingly perceived as a basic dimension of life in industrial societies, offering a source of inspiration and identification.“⁶⁹ Assumptions of a symbiosis between secularization and modernization now are mostly regarded as a mirror of the hopes of secular intellectuals. The hypothesis of secularization – stating that religion on the whole has lost sig-

sa in reakcije na Češ koslovaš kem [„The Czechoslovak-Italian battle“. International dimensions of the first Trieste trial and Czechoslovak reactions], in: *Annales. Series Historia et Sociologia* 16/1, 2006, p. 15-30; **Id.**, Češ koslovaš ka in tržaš ko vpraš anje [Czechoslovakia and the Trieste question], in: Jože Pirjevec, Gorazd Bajc, **Borut Klabjan** (eds.), *Vojna in mir na Primorskem: od kapitulacije Italije 1943 do Londonskega memorandum leta 1954* [War and peace in the Littoral: from the capitulation of Italy 1943 to the London Memorandum 1954], Koper 2005, p. 165-182; **Id.**, Italija in srednjeevropske povezave v polovici tridesetih let dva-jsetega stoletja [Italy and the connections to Central Europe in the first half of the 1930s], in: *Actae Histriae* 12/2, 2004, p. 107-134; **Id.**, Faš istična Italija na Slovaš kem: odnosi med Italijo in Slovaš ko od Mussolini-jevega vzpona na oblast do njegove kapitulacije [Fascist Italy and Slovakia: Relations between Italy and Slovakia from Mussolini's takeover of power to his capitulation], in: *Annales. Series Historia et Sociologia* 13/1, 2003, p. 149-162; **Id.**, La percezione del fascismo in Slovacchia [The perception of fascism in Slovakia], in: *Slavia* 11/3, 2002, p. 161-185.

⁶⁷ **Guido Franzinetti**, *Diritti e conflitti*.

⁶⁸ This set of questions essentially follows Hirschhausen, Leonhard, *Europäische Nationalismen im West-Ost-Vergleich*, p. 21-43.

⁶⁹ Patrick Pasture, *The Role of Religion in Social and Labour History*, in: Marcel van der Linden, Lex Heerma van Voss (eds.), *Class and Other Identities. Gender, Religion, and Ethnicity in the Writing of European Labour History*, New York et al., 2002, p. 101-132, p. 101. Cf. Urs Altermatt, Franziska Metzger, *Religion und Kultur – zeitgeschichtliche Perspektiven*, in: *Schweizer Zeitschrift für Religions- und Kulturgeschichte* 98, 2004, p. 185-208; and from a sociological perspective Bernhard Giesen, **Daniel Šuber** (eds.), *Religion and Politics. Cultural Perspectives*, Leiden 2005.

nificance in modern societies – was counteracted by the thesis of the 19th century as “second confessional age”.⁷⁰ Not least it was the end of communism that brought the interconnections between religion and nation as well as their role within European modernity back into a brighter light. In the face of the manifest effectiveness of religion and nation in the 1990s the concept of “political religion” obtained momentum. Its usefulness is controversial, however.⁷¹ While the rhetoric of the „holy nation“ constituted a substantial part of nationalist propaganda, up to its most extreme, national socialist variant, this cannot put aside the fact that in European societies “religion” did not dissolve into or was substituted by “nation” – both remained separate concepts, in spite of plurifold, and sometimes intensive intercorrelations.⁷²

That the cross-identity aspects between the religious and/or confessional on the one hand and the national on the other are not to be underestimated, up to phenomena of longer duration, is evidenced by the variability of examples. An inherited burden of the Italian nation state was the antagonism between the liberal and the catholic Italy, which played a significant role also during the fascist years.⁷³ Both Czechs and Slovenes picked in Jan Hus and Primož Trubar religious reformers as national founding figures.⁷⁴ At the same time, a connection between catholicism and Slovene nationality is constructed that is nothing short of symbiotic.⁷⁵ The same is valid for the strong Polish minority in Prussia,⁷⁶ and after

⁷⁰ Olaf Blaschke, *Konfessionen im Konflikt. Deutschland zwischen 1800 und 1970: ein zweites konfessionelles Zeitalter*, Göttingen 2002; Id., *Das 19. Jahrhundert: Ein zweites konfessionelles Zeitalter?* in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 26/1, 2000, p. 38-75; Martin Schulze Wessel, *Das 19. Jahrhundert als „zweites konfessionelles Zeitalter“? Thesen zur Religionsgeschichte der böhmischen Länder in europäischer Hinsicht*, in: *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropaforschung*, 2002, 2, p. 514-529.

⁷¹ Cf. for example Philippe Burrin, *Political Religion. The Relevance of a Concept*, in: *History and Memory* 9, 1997, p. 321-352.

⁷² Hartmut Lehmann, *Über die Varianten einer komplementären Relation: Die Säkularisierung der Nation im 20. Jahrhundert*, in: Id., *Protestantisches Christentum im Prozeß der Säkularisierung*, Göttingen 2001.

⁷³ David I. Kertzer, *Prisoner of the Vatican. The Popes' Secret Plot to Capture Rome From the New Italian State*, Boston 2004. For the fascist period **Lutz Klinkhammer**, *Il fascismo italiano tra religione di Stato e liturgia politica [Italian fascism between state religion and political liturgy]*, in: Vincenzo Ferrone (ed.), *La Chiesa cattolica e il totalitarismo. VIII giornata Luigi Firpo. Atti del Convegno Torino 25-26 ottobre 2001 [The catholic church and totalitarianism. VIII. conference Luigi Firpo. Proceedings]*, Firenze 2004, p. 185-203; Id., *Mussolinis Italien zwischen Staat, Kirche und Religion*, in: Klaus Hildebrand (ed.), *Zwischen Politik und Religion. Studien zur Entstehung, Existenz und Wirkung des Totalitarismus*, München 2003, p. 73-90; and from a Slovene perspective **Egon Pelikan**, *Tajno delovanje primorske duhovščine pod faš izmom. Primorski krščanski socialci med Vatikanom, faš istično Italijo in slovensko katoliš ko desnico [The underground activities of clergymen in the Littoral during fascism. The Christian social activists between the Vatican, fascist Italy, and the Slovene catholic right wing]*, Ljubljana 2002.

⁷⁴ Martin Schulze Wessel, *Die Konfessionalisierung der tschechischen Nation*, in: **Heinz-Gerhard Haupt**, Dieter Langewiesche (eds.) *Nation und Religion in Europa. Mehrkonfessionelle Gesellschaften im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Frankfurt a. M., New York 2004, p. 135-150; Janez Rotar, *Die Nationwerdung der Slowenen und die Reformation: Trubars Benennungen von Ländern und Völkern*, München 1991.

⁷⁵ **Egon Pelikan**, *Pravi Slovenec je katoličan [A real Slovene is catholic]*, in: Jelka Razpotnik, Helena Pačnik (eds.), *Vloga mitov pri poučevanju slovenske zgodovine: zbornik referatov [The role of myths in the teaching of Slovene history: Proceedings]*, Ljubljana 2003, p. 25-42; cf. also Id., *Slovenski politični katolicizem v tridesetih letih v luči evropskih izkuš enj [Slovene political catholicism in the 1930s in the light of European experiences]*, in: Peter Vodopivec (ed.), *Slovinci v Evropi [The Slovenes in Europe]*, Ljubljana 2002, p. 105-144; Id., *Akomodacija ideologije političnega katolicizma na Slovenskem [The adaptation of the ideology of political catholicism in Slovenia]*, Maribor 1997.

⁷⁶ Albert Kotowski, *Polen in Deutschland: Religiöse Symbolik als Mittel der nationalen Selbstbehauptung (1870-1918)*, in: **Haupt**, Langewiesche, *Nation und Religion in Europa*, p. 253-279.

1989 catholicism still remained an integral part of Polish identity.⁷⁷ In Romania, the constructors of the nation inseparably connected being Romanian to orthodoxy, which was the basis for the religious messianic message of the legion of the Archangel Michael and its particularly extreme propensity to violence.⁷⁸ In Hungary, a cult of the protestant transylvanian tradition was created in rejection of Austria and the Habsburgs,⁷⁹ and the aspect of protestant-Hungarian resistance against the catholic monarchy resulted handy to the Hungarian stalinists of the 1950s.⁸⁰ Lenin's mausoleum and the Parisian Pantheon directly borrowed from orthodoxy and catholicism. On the other hand, Turkey was defined along secular lines and searched for its roots in pagan Central Asia rather than in Islam.⁸¹ It was no coincidence that in Germany the *Kulturkampf* after 1870 aimed at the catholics.⁸² The GDR instrumentalized Martin Luther and Thomas Müntzer and remembered Ernst Thälmann as immortal and "holy".⁸³ But in Western Germany also, the statal reconstruction after the war led to a renewed discussion about the religious identity of the nation. The dissolution of Prussia in 1947 and the creation of the Federal Republic two years later put an end to Germany as a predominantly protestant nation. The catholic Adenauer stood at the top of a country in which protestant and catholic lands made up almost equal parts. The long *durée* effectiveness of earlier national-religious antagonisms can be seen, for example, in the fact that protestant representatives suspected that Adenauer's catholicism was a reason for his lack of interest in a reunification with protestant Eastern Germany.⁸⁴ During the 1980s, a debate flared up in Yugoslavia about whether the country's multi-religiousness constituted an unacceptable danger to the nation.⁸⁵ In any case, it seems necessary to over-

⁷⁷ Geneviève Zubrzycki, *The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-Communist Poland*, Chicago 2006.

⁷⁸ **Constantin Iordachi**, *Charisma, Religion, Ideology: Romania's Interwar Legion of the Archangel Michael*, in: John R. Lampe, Mark Mazower (eds.), *Ideologies and National Identities. The Case of Twentieth Century Southeastern Europe*, Budapest 2004, p. 19-53.

⁷⁹ **Bojan Aleksov**, *Religious Dissent between the Modern and the National: Nazarenes in Hungary and Serbia 1850-1914*, Wiesbaden 2006.

⁸⁰ Eric Roman, *The Stalin Years in Hungary*, Lewiston 1999.

⁸¹ **Fikret Adanir**, Bernd Bonwetsch (eds.), *Osmanismus, Nationalismus und der Kaukasus. Muslime und Christen, Türken und Armenier im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Wiesbaden 2005; **Vangelis Kechriotis**, *Turkish Nationalism or Muslim allegiance? The Debate in Late Ottoman Studies and the Preconditions of Kemalist Ideology*, in: Jasna Dragović-Soso et al. (eds.), *History of the Present. Workshop on Southeast European History*, Belgrade 22-23 November 2001, London 2002, p. 51-54.

⁸² Jürgen Strötzer, *Der Katholizismus im deutschen Kaiserreich 1871-1918: Strukturen eines problematischen Verhältnisses zwischen Widerstand und Integration*, vol. 1: Reichsgründung und Kulturkampf (1871-1890), Hamburg 2005. For the previous period cf. Nikolaus Buschmann, *Auferstehung der Nation? Konfession und Nationalismus vor der Reichsgründung in der Debatte jüdischer, protestantischer und katholischer Kreise*, in: **Heinz-Gerhard Haupt**, Dieter Langewiesche (eds.), *Nation und Religion in der deutschen Geschichte*, Frankfurt am Main, New York 2001, p. 333-388.

⁸³ Robert Walinski-Kiehl, *Reformation History and Political Mythology in the German Democratic Republic*, in: *European History Quarterly*, 34/1, 2004, 43-67; Rolf Richter, *Über evangelische Kirchen in der DDR, Religion und Geschichtsschreibung*, in: Alfred Loesdau, Helmut Meier (eds.), *Zur Geschichte der Historiographie nach 1945. Beiträge eines Kolloquiums zum 75. Geburtstag von Gerhard Loze*, Berlin 2001.

⁸⁴ Manfred Gallus, Hartmut Lehmann, *Nationalprotestantische Mentalitäten. Konturen, Entwicklungslinien und Umbrüche eines Weltbildes*, Göttingen 2005.

⁸⁵ Klaus Buchenau, *Orthodoxie und Katholizismus in Jugoslawien 1945-1991. Ein serbisch-kroatischer Vergleich*, Wiesbaden 2004; Id., *Kämpfende Kirchen. Jugoslawiens religiöse Hypothek*, Frankfurt a. M. et al. 2006; Thomas Bremer, *Kleine Geschichte der Religionen in Jugoslawien. Königreich - Kommunismus - Krieg*, Freiburg 2003. Cf. also Kathrin Boeckh, *Zur Religionsverfolgung in Jugoslawien 1944-1953: Stalinistische Anleihen unter Tito*, in: Clewing, Schmitt, *Südosteuropa. Von vormoderner Vielfalt und nationalstaatlicher Vereinheitlichung*, p. 431-462; **Krzysztof Zalewski**, *Polityka i symbole. Komunistyczna Partia*

come the customary identification of religion and nation in the Balkans as an explanatory pattern for all possible historical phenomena and renew reflections on their significance and historical coming about.⁸⁶

Here also, comparative endeavors would gain from a more complex approach and the concept of relative synchronicity: The relationship between nation and religion often was the motive for deep conflicts within nations, and both between confessions (and secular ideologies) as well as within confessional groups.⁸⁷ The secularly oriented agitators of national movements in many a place by no means gave up their ties to the church and, within the private realm, approved of religious-national (read: religious-secular) compromises. The nation as a supraconfessional construct made it possible for religious minorities like the Jews to also participate in the national master narrative and the national institutions.⁸⁸ In addition to the sacralization of the nation, the nationalization of the church has to be taken into account. Religious entities as well as religious life itself changed through their identification with the nation. Which role, then, did religion play in legitimizing – up to sacraliz-

Jugosławii wobec społeczności wieloetnicznej. Przykład Suboticy (Wojwodina) [Politics and symbols. The KPJ and a multiethnic town. The case of Subotica (Vojvodina)], in: *Studia z dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* 40, 2005, p. 143-165; **Id.**, Od „słowiańskiej jedności” do „klucza narodowego”. Polityka narodowa Komunistycznej Partii Jugosławii w latach 1944-1948 [From „Slav unity” to „national key”. The national policies of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia], in: *Przegląd Polonijny*, 30/1, 2004, p. 53-77.

⁸⁶ Cf. Hans-Christian Maner, Norbert Spannenberger (eds.), *Konfessionelle Identität und nationales Engagement. Die griechisch-katholischen Kirchen in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (in print); **Bojan Aleksov**, Adamant and Treacherous: Serbian Historians on Religious Conversions, in: Pål Kolsto (ed.), *Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe*, London 2005, p. 158-190; **Id.**, Perception of Islamization in the Serbian National Discourse, in: *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 5/1, 2005, p. 113-127; **Id.**, Nationalism in Construction: The Memorial Church of St. Sava on Vračar Hill in Belgrade, in: *Balkanologie* 7/2, 2003, p. 47-72; **Id.**, Die Interpretation des religiösen Bekenntniswechsels bei der Herausbildung des serbischen Nationalbewusstseins, in: *Jahrbücher für Geschichte und Kultur Südosteuropas* 4, 2002, p. 39-67; Konrad Clewing, *Nationale Identitätsbildung und Konfession in Dalmatien bis 1848/49. Anmerkungen zum Verhältnis von Nation und Religion bei den Südslawen*, in: Flavius Solomon et al. (ed.), *Südosteuropa im 20. Jahrhundert. Ethnostrukturen, Identitäten, Konflikte*. Iași, Konstanz 2004, p. 159-179; Kathrin Boeckh, „Völlig normal, entsprechend den Prinzipien der Gewissensfreiheit, garantiert durch die Stalin-Verfassung“. Die Verfolgung der Kirchen in Galizien unter Stalin im Vergleich (1944-1953), in: *Historische Zeitschrift* 278/1, 2004, p. 55-100; **Holm Sundhausen** et al. (ed.), *Religionen und Kulturen in Südosteuropa. Nebeneinander und Miteinander von Muslimen und Christen*, Berlin 2003; **Fikret Adanir**, *Religious Communities and Ethnic Groups Under Imperial Sway: Ottoman and Habsburg Lands in Comparison*, in: Dirk Hoerder et al. (eds.), *The Historical Practice of Diversity: Transcultural Interactions From the Early Modern Mediterranean to the Postcolonial World*, Oxford, New York, 2003, p. 54-86; Hans-Christian Maner, Martin Schulze Wessel (eds.): *Religion im Nationalstaat in der Zeit zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen (1918-1939). Polen-Tschechoslowakei-Ungarn-Rumänien*, Stuttgart 2002; Paschalis Kitromilides, *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy. Studies in the Culture and Political Thought of Southeastern Europe*, Aldershot, London 1994.

⁸⁷ Oliver Zimmer, *A Contested Nation. History, Memory and Nationalism in Switzerland 1761-1891*, Cambridge 2003, p. 14-15, points out that in late 18th and 19th century Switzerland regions, localities, political and religious groups „fought for status, prestige, and acknowledgement“ within the nation. This was a pattern to be found in the whole of Europe, and not confined to the 19th century. One of the rare European-wide comparative volumes that includes also Southeast European case studies, is Michael Geyer, Hartmut Lehmann (eds.), *Religion und Nation – Nation und Religion. Beiträge zu einer unbewältigten Geschichte*, Göttingen 2004.

⁸⁸ Cf. for example Simone Lässig, *Jüdische Wege ins Bürgertum. Kulturelles Kapital und sozialer Aufstieg im 19. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen 2004; Tullia Catalan, *La comunità ebraica di Trieste (1781-1914). Politica, società e cultura* [The Jewish community in Trieste. Politics, society, and culture], Trieste 2000.

ing – nations? And how did such interrelations look like in those European nations that officially were secularized?⁸⁹

This section enquires into the intercorrelations between religious, national, and social identities, spanning the 19th and 20th centuries. It takes as examples the Nazarenes in Hungary and Serbia and the political catholicism of the Slovenes,⁹⁰ Serbian and Bulgarian national-religious figures of memory⁹¹, Western European research threads on the topic of nation and religion,⁹² interconfessional negotiations in communist and post-communist Romania,⁹³ as well as the muslims/Bosniaks in Southern Serbian Novi Pazar/Sandžak after the Second World War.⁹⁴

Accommodation, Protest, Resistance: Acting Within and Against Social Structures

Marx by no means identified the „given and handed down circumstances”, which let humans make their “own history”, yet “not of their own free will”, with materialistic dialectics of historical circumstantial constraints, but rather with “tradition” that “weighed heavily on the minds of the living”, as “old names, battle cries, costumes” and a “borrowed language” taken over from the past - that is to say with a symbolic and discursive tradition.⁹⁵ This methodological flash of inspiration has not been taken up neither by history nor by

⁸⁹ Danièle Hervieu-Léger, *Religiöse Ausdrucksformen der Moderne. Die Phänomene des Glaubens in den europäischen Gesellschaften*, in: Hartmut Kaelble, Jürgen Schriewer (eds.), *Diskurse und Entwicklungspfade. Der Gesellschaftsvergleich in den Geschichts- und Sozialwissenschaften*, Frankfurt a. M. 1999, p. 133-161; Martin Schulze Wessel, *Religion – Gesellschaft – Nation. Anmerkungen zu Arbeitsfeldern und Perspektiven moderner Religionsgeschichte Osteuropas*, in: *Nordost-Archiv* 7 (1998), 2, p. 353-364.

⁹⁰ Egon Pelikan, see notes 73 and 75; Bojan Aleksov, see notes 79 and 86.

⁹¹ Stefan Rohdewald, *Nationale religiöse Erinnerungsfiguren der orthodoxen Südslawen bis 1945*, research project, Passau University; Id., *Die Heiligen Sava, Ivan von Rila und Kliment von Ohrid in nationalen Diensten: Zur Funktion nationaler Heiliger im serbischen, bulgarischen und makedonischen Kontext im ausgehenden 20. Jahrhundert*, in: Stefan Samerski (ed.), *Säkularisierung und Funktionalisierung von Nationalheiligen Ostmitteleuropas im 20./21. Jahrhundert* (in print).

⁹² Helke Stadtland, *Geschichte der Ökumene als transnationale religiöse Bewegung in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts*, research project, Bochum University.

⁹³ Anca Sincan, *Utopian Reformists, Freedom Fighters and Collaborationists: Oppositional Groups to the Communist Regime Inside the Romanian Orthodox Church (1945-1964)*, Ph. D. project, Central European University Budapest; Id., *Inventing Ecumenism? Inter-confessional Dialogue in 1960s Romania*, in: *Religion in Eastern Europe* 26/3, 2006 (in print); Id., *Ecumenism as Politics. Patterns in the Solution of the Romanian Orthodox Church - Romanian Greek Catholic Church Crisis in the Early 1990s*, in: *Studia Universitatis Petru Maior*, 6, 2005.

⁹⁴ Krzysztof Zalewski, *Muzułmanie czy Bośniacy? O warunkach politycznych i roli historii w redefinicji projektu narodowego słowiańskich muzułmanów w Sandżaku (Serbia i Czarnogóra) [Muslims or Bosniaks. On the political situation and the role of history in the redefinition of the national project among Slav Muslims in the Sandžak]*, in: *Polska – Unia Europejska – Świat. Materiały ze Zjazdu Polskiego Towarzystwa Nauk Politycznych [Poland – European Union – World. Proceedings of the Conference of the Polish Association for Political Studies]*, 2005, p. 167-177; cf. also Konrad Clewing, *Der Sandžak als Problem? Bosniakisch-muslimische plurale Identitäten und die Staatskrise der BR Jugoslawien*, in: *Südosteuropa* 50 (2001), p. 588-601. Furthermore Fikret Adanir, *The Formation of a Muslim Nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina: a Historiographic Discussion*, in: Id., *Faroqhi, The Ottomans and the Balkans*, p. 267-304; Christiane Dick, *Aus Muslimen werden Bosniaken. Der Beitrag Adil Zulfikarpašićs zur Konstruktion und Anerkennung des "Bosniakentums"*, in: *Jahrbücher Geschichte und Kultur Südosteuropas* 4, 2002, p. 109-129.

⁹⁵ Karl Marx, *Der 18. Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte*, in: Id./Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, vol. 8, Berlin 1960/1852, p. 115–207, p. 115.

historiography during the centuries that followed. Only since approximately two and a half decades questions have come to the fore about the relationship between structure and agency, the post-structuralist discourse analysis, memory research, as well as the significance of symbols and rituals as system of reference that provide meaning.⁹⁶ The significance of crises and radical change as catalysts and focal points for the construction and articulation of the nation and as constitutive moments of nation-building within all European national movements has already been emphasized.⁹⁷ Accordingly, panel 5 explores in a concentrated manner the field of tension of accommodation, protest, and resistance within varying social structures, by means of micro-historic, actor- and life-world-centered case studies.

Durkheim noted that „social facts“ were „in a certain sense [...] independent from individuals“ and stood „outside the individual consciousness“, because they were not created by an isolated individual, but rather by communicative interaction.⁹⁸ This concerns the constitutive factors for the creation of social reality in the Weberian sense, i. e. the collective patterns of interpretations that mold into patterns of thought and attitude, into mentalities of individuals and groups.⁹⁹ The struggle for an adequate relation between structure and agency should, however, not lead from the reductionist, i. e. exclusively collective identity categories of older social history and particularly workers' history to its radical opposite, i. e. a merely subjective and individualistic approach.¹⁰⁰ Rather, the contributions to this panel integrate social and cultural history and combine macro and micro history, structure and agency. On the background of socioeconomic and sociopolitical contexts they unfold the „interrelations between structures and individual thought and action“¹⁰¹ in non-democratic (*durchherrschte*) societies. State (and other institutional) power as social practice manifests itself in a plurifold field of tension and stands at the center of attention: The relationships within a given social group are investigated, i. e. forms of communication, solidarity, competition, power, work and cooperation, and at the same time also the power, market, work, and social relationships between different social groups. The intersection of such an analysis of structures that become apparent in individual actions is constituted by the search for the *Eigen-Sinn* (approx. *willful obstinacy*) of the protagonists, and for their exploring of potentials within given social, communicative, and power systems.¹⁰²

⁹⁶ Andreas Sutter, Manfred Hettling (eds.), *Struktur und Ereignis*, Göttingen 2001, containing: **Thomas Welskopp**, Die Dualität von Struktur und Handeln. Anthony Giddens' Strukturierungstheorie als „praxeologischer“ Ansatz in der Geschichtswissenschaft, p. 99-119.

⁹⁷ Hirschhausen, Leonhard, *Europäische Nationalismen im West-Ost-Vergleich*, p. 40ff.

⁹⁸ Èmile Durkheim, *Individuelle und kollektive Vorstellungen*, in: Id., *Soziologie und Philosophie*. Mit einer Einleitung von Theodor Adorno, Frankfurt a. M. 1976/1898, p. 45-83, p. 71.

⁹⁹ Max Weber, Die „Objektivität“ sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis, in: Id., *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, Tübingen 1973⁴, p. 146-214, p. 180f. Cf. **Thomas Welskopp**, Der Mensch und die Verhältnisse. „Handeln“ und „Struktur“ bei Max Weber und Anthony Giddens, in: Thomas Mergel, **Thomas Welskopp** (eds.), *Geschichte zwischen Kultur und Gesellschaft*. Beiträge zur Theoriedebatte, München 1997, p. 39-70.

¹⁰⁰ Accordingly the reminder in **Welskopp**, *Das Banner der Brüderlichkeit*. Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie vom Vormärz bis zum Sozialistengesetz, Bonn 2000, p. 28; **Id.**, *Arbeitergeschichte im Jahr 2000*. Bilanz und Perspektiven, in: *Traverse*. Zeitschrift für Geschichte 7, 2000, p. 15-30, p. 27.

¹⁰¹ Heiko Haumann, *Lebensweltlich orientierte Geschichtsschreibung in den jüdischen Studien*. Das Basler Beispiel, in: Klaus Hödl (ed.), *Jüdische Studien*. Reflexionen zu Theorie und Praxis eines wissenschaftlichen Feldes, Innsbruck 2003, p. 105-122, p. 106. Aleida Assmann, *Kultur als Lebenswelt und Monument*, in: **Id./Dietrich Harth** (eds.): *Kultur als Lebenswelt und Monument*, Frankfurt am Main 1991, p. 11-25, p. 12, defines *life-world* as the „base of common values, ideas, presuppositions, which social acting and life rests upon.“

¹⁰² Cf. Jürgen Kocka, *Eine durchherrschte Gesellschaft*, in: Hartmut Kaelble et al. (eds.), *Sozialgeschichte der*

With regard to the Balkans, the handling of and the acting against social structures has hardly been taken up by scholars. Such topics mostly were contextualized – if not instrumentalized¹⁰³ - within the framework of social, institutional, political or national history.¹⁰⁴ Yet, it seems a crucial question, if and how ethnic and national affiliations and patterns of solidarity stood crosswise to their social pendants. The chance for a “sober historical analysis of forms of work, production relationships, forms of life, constructions of identity [...] of important social groups of modern society, that increasingly have to be regarded as integral parts of this society“,¹⁰⁵ has only rarely been taken up for Southeastern Europe.¹⁰⁶ For the rest of Eastern Europe, they likewise are new,¹⁰⁷ and within the Western European scholarly landscape they are no older than a decade and a half.¹⁰⁸

The contributions to this panel arch from the peasant uprisings in transleithanian Croatia-Slavonia¹⁰⁹ and the role of violence in the Ottoman Empire¹¹⁰ at the end of the 19th century

DDR, Stuttgart 1994, p. 547-553; Alf Lüdtke (ed.), *Herrschaft als soziale Praxis. Historische und sozialanthropologische Studien*, Göttingen 1991; Id., *Die Praxis von Herrschaft: Zur Analyse von Hinnehmen und Mitmachen im deutschen Faschismus*, in: Brigitte Berlekamp, Werner Röhr (eds.), *Terror, Herrschaft und Alltag im Nationalsozialismus. Probleme einer Sozialgeschichte des deutschen Faschismus*, Münster 1995, p. 226-245; Id., *Eigen-Sinn. Fabrikalltag, Arbeitererfahrungen und Politik vom Kaiserreich bis in den Faschismus*, Hamburg 1993; **Thomas Welskopp**, *Der Betrieb als soziales Handlungsfeld. Neuere Forschungsansätze in der Industrie- und Arbeitergeschichte*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 22/1, 1996, p. 117-141; **Bruno Groppo**, *Le siècle des communismes*, Paris 2000; Id. et al. (eds.), *Die Arbeiterbewegung – ein gescheitertes Projekt der Moderne?*, Leipzig 2000.

¹⁰³ This is true for example for the topos of the liberation wars, cf. **Dimou**, „... and then the Prince kissed Sleeping Beauty.“

¹⁰⁴ Mete Tunçay, Erik J. Zürcher (eds.), *Socialism and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1923*, London 1994, containing: **Fikret Adanir**, *The National Question and the Genesis and Development of Socialism in the Ottoman Empire: the Case of Macedonia*, p. 27-48. With regard to the interwar years Oberländer, *Autoritäre Regime*; **Vesna Drapac**, *A King is Killed in Marseille. France and Yugoslavia in 1934*, at www.h-france.net/rude/2005conference/Drapac2.pdf

¹⁰⁵ **Welskopp**, *Arbeitergeschichte*, p. 16.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. the research overview in **Fikret Adanir** (ed.), *Social Movements in Southeast Europe. Reassessment of Historiography and Perspectives For Future Research*, *Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen*, 33, 2005.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Christoph Boyer (ed.), *Sozialistische Wirtschaftsreformen. Tschechoslowakei und DDR im Vergleich*, Frankfurt am Main 2006; Christiane Brenner, Peter Heumos (eds.), *Sozialgeschichtliche Kommunismusforschung. Tschechoslowakei, Polen, Ungarn und DDR 1948-1968*, München 2005, containing: **Helke Stadtland**, *Kommunisten und Kultur. Überlegungen zur betrieblichen Kulturarbeit der staatssozialistischen Gewerkschaften Osteuropas und der DDR*, p. 205-242. An exception is the comparatively detailed research on Eastern Germany, cf. **Klaus Tenfelde** (ed.), *Sozialgeschichte des deutschen Kommunismus. Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 21/1, 1995; Id., Peter Hübner (eds.), *Arbeiter in der SBZ-DDR*, Essen 1999; **Helke Stadtland**, *Herrschaft nach Plan und Macht der Gewohnheit. Sozialgeschichte der Gewerkschaften in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1953*, Essen 2001; Id., „Avantgarde“, „Exekutive“ oder „Sprachrohr“ der Beschäftigten. *Gewerkschaftsfunktionäre im „Kaderstaat“ der DDR*, in: Id., Till Kössler (eds.), *Vom Funktionieren der Funktionäre. Politische Interessenvertretung und gesellschaftliche Integration in Deutschland nach 1933*, p. 127-156; as well as the four volume edition of the Centre for Research on Contemporary History in Potsdam ‚Structures of power and dimensions of experience in the history of the GDR‘: Thomas Lindenberger (ed.), *Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur. Studien zur Gesellschaftsgeschichte der DDR*; Michael Lemke (ed.), *Sowjetisierung und Eigenständigkeit in der SBZ/DDR (1945-1953)*; Martin Sabrow (ed.), *Geschichte als Herrschaftsdiskurs. Der Umgang mit der Vergangenheit in der DDR*; Peter Hübner (ed.), *Eliten im Sozialismus. Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte der DDR*, alle Köln, Weimar, Wien 1999.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. the overviews in **Bruno Groppo** et al. (eds.), *Quellen und Historiographie der Arbeiterbewegung nach dem Zusammenbruch des Realsozialismus*, Wien 1998; and **Welskopp**, *Arbeitergeschichte*.

¹⁰⁹ **Stefano Petrunaro**, *Un anno burrascoso. I tumulti del 1897 in Croazia-Slavonia [A stormy year. The turmoils of 1897 in Croatia-Slavonia]*, Ph. D. project, Venice University.

to the establishment of cooperativism in inter-war Bulgaria¹¹¹ and the process of collectivization in Romania after the Second World War¹¹², and lastly to the spaces of action of Basque cultural associations in Franco's Spain¹¹³ as well as of student organisations in Papadopoulos' Greece.¹¹⁴

This outline of the clustering of the conference's panels with regard to central tropes of European social history vividly demonstrates, in how far the existing scholarly interconnections between the conference participants carry potentials for establishing and fostering interdisciplinary communication. I am confident that the negotiation and definition of research desiderata and of cooperative ventures, with the goal of incorporating Southeastern European history into overall European history, will be conducted on solid grounds and will serve as a significant impulse.

¹¹⁰ **Andreas Helmedach**, *Reaya, Gewalt und staatliche Ordnung im europäischen Teil des Osmanischen Reiches vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zu den Balkankriegen*, research project.

¹¹¹ **Augusta Dimou**, *Kooperativismus im Bulgarien der Zwischenkriegszeit*, research project.

¹¹² **Constantin Iordachi**, Dobrin Dobrinu (eds.), *Peasants Into Lumpen. The Process of Land Collectivization in Romania, 1949-1962*, Budapest 2006 (forthcoming).

¹¹³ **Amaia Lamikiz Jauregiondo**, *Sociability, Culture and Identity: Associations for the Promotions of an Alternative Culture Under the Franco Regime (Gipuzkoa, 1960s-1970s)*, Ph. D., European University Institute, Florence, 2005; **Id.**, *La perspectiva local en el estudio de la sociabilidad: espacios asociativos de la juventud guipuzcoana en la década de 1960* [The local perspective in research on sociability: associative spaces of Guipuzcoa's youth in the 1960s], in: *Vasconia: Cuadernos de historia – geografía*, 33, 2003, p. 49-61; **Id.**, *Ambiguous "culture". Contrasting interpretations of the Basque film Ama Lur and the relationship between centre and periphery in Franco's Spain*, in: *National Identities* 4/3, 2002, p. 291-306; For comparative aspects of Franco's Spain cf. the *Jahrbuch für Europäische Geschichte* 4, 2003, focussed on „Diktaturbewältigung, Erinnerungspolitik und Geschichtskultur in Polen und Spanien“.

¹¹⁴ **Konstantinos Kornetis**, *Student Resistance to the Greek Military Dictatorship: Subjectivity, Memory, and Cultural Politics, 1967-1974*, Ph. D., European University Institute, Florence 2006; cf. also Mogens Pelt, *Tying Greece to the West: American, West German, Greek Relations 1945-1974*, Copenhagen (in print).